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Abstract
This paper provides evidence for a causal e↵ect of the threat of entry on capital
structure in the airline industry. Building on the previous literature, the evolution
of the main low cost air carriers’ route network is used to identify routes where the
probability of future entry dramatically increases. Empirical results show that
when the most strategic routes are threatened, incumbents increase significantly
debt maturity be f ore low cost airlines start flying. Overall, my findings suggest
that airlines respond to entry threats by lengthening the maturity of their debt
for two reasons. First, airlines want to reduce liquidity risk. Second, the threat
of entry limits incumbents’ access to short-term bank debt.
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1 Introduction
The financial structure of firms has relevant implications for their ability to survive in
competitive markets. For instance, a large literature explains that“deep-pocketed firms”
will attempt to drive financially constrained competitors out of business (see, e.g., Telser
(1966), Bolton and Scharfstein (1990)), while firms operating in tougher markets are
more exposed to the risk of failing to rollover their debt at maturity (Diamond (1991)).
A natural ex ante implication of this is that if firms anticipate tougher competition in
the future, they should seek to adapt their financial structure today. However, empirical
support for a causal e↵ect of expected competition on financing choices is scarce at the
very best.
This paper documents how the threat of entry a↵ects corporate debt maturity
decisions in the context of the American domestic airline industry. The choice of airlines
as the main setting for such an analysis is driven by two considerations. First, domestic
flights are (relatively) homogeneous products o↵ered in a very competitive market.
Second, it is empirically challenging to find a relation between corporate debt structure
and competition. While competition may exhibit a trigger e↵ect, debt and entry choices
are endogenously determined and a↵ected by other factors that weaken the empirical
relation between the two. A domestic airlines setting provides rich data availability that
makes it possible to identify a causal e↵ect of expected competition on debt maturity
choices.
Specifically, the main empirical challenge consists in identifying a setting in which
incumbents can realize that the probability of entry has increased but their profitability
has not yet been impacted, allowing them to have the necessary flexibility to change
capital structure. In the airline industry, domestic flight data collected by the U.S.
Department of Transportation make it possible to establish flight routes for each air
carrier. In particular, building on Goolsbee and Syverson (2008), this paper looks at
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the evolution of the route network of the major low cost airlines in the United States.
The focus is on situations where a low cost carrier begins to operate at one endpoint of
a route (having already been operating out of the other endpoint), but before it starts
flying the route connecting the two endpoints.
As an illustrative example, consider Southwest’s entry into Washington Dulles In-
ternational Airport. Southwest began to fly out of Dulles (IAD) in October 2006, with
nonstop flights to four cities in its network, and one-stop service to several others. How-
ever, upon entering Dulles Airport, Southwest did not immediately start flying on the
route Dulles (IAD)-Cleveland (CLE). Cleveland is also a Southwest airport: The airline
flew between CLE and other airports, but not the CLE-IAD route. It is reasonable to
expect that, after Southwest began to operate at both endpoints of the route, compet-
ing airlines would soon realize that the probability of Southwest entering the Dulles
(IAD)-Cleveland (CLE) route had risen dramatically (in fact it started to fly the route
in 2007).1
In particular, when a low cost airline starts operations out of both endpoints of a
route, the probability that it will enter the route itself the year after increases dispro-
portionally. Importantly, this is observable by incumbents (and potentially by lenders
as well). This paper explores how the capital structure of incumbents changes in re-
sponse to this threat. I find that airlines exposed to the threat of entry by low cost
airlines significantly increase the proportion of long-term liabilities they hold, substitut-
ing short-term with long-term debt. This e↵ect is significantly stronger when relatively
more important routes in terms of passenger tra c are threatened. Conversely, I do
not find an e↵ect on leverage or on the overall level of debt.
In my analysis, I focus only on the threat posed by the main low cost airlines for
three reasons. First, I find that the entry of a low cost carrier disrupts route profitability.
1This example is taken from Goolsbee and Syverson (2008).
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Using a 10% random sample of all tickets sold by domestic airlines, I find that when a
low cost airline actually starts flying on a route, average fares (adjusted for inflation)
charged by all carriers operating on the same route drop by 6.4% on average. This
number is particularly striking if one considers that the average profit margin in the
airline industry is about 1%.2 Conversely, the entry of legacy carriers has a much more
contained e↵ect on prices. Second, low cost airlines have expanded significantly in the
last decade. Therefore, the entry in the second endpoint airport of a route increases
significantly the probability that the low cost airline will enter the route itself soon
(usually in year t+1 or t+2) forcing incumbents to change their capital structure quickly.
Third, low cost carriers (mostly) do not enter into alliances or codeshare agreements
with competing airlines. Therefore, they are regarded as competitors by incumbent
airlines when they enter a new route.
The disruptive e↵ect of low cost airlines’ entry suggests that incumbents should
anticipate actual entrance in order to adapt their financial structure before their prof-
itability and cash flows are a↵ected. My empirical findings indicate that incumbents
respond to the threat of entry changing the structure of their debt. In particular, a
one-standard deviation increase in the exposure to the threat of entry triggers an in-
crease of 5.4% in the proportion of long-term debt held. This latter finding provides
insight into the risk management strategy employed by airline companies. Longer debt
maturity allows firms to reduce liquidity risk, i.e., the risk that lenders are unwilling to
refinance when bad news arrives. When a firm is unable to rollover its debt, or to pay
it back, it will have to pay potentially high restructuring costs (e.g., to liquidate assets,
seek alternative sources of financing or renegotiate the debt). Therefore, from a firm’s
perspective it would be optimal to secure long-term financing before cutthroat com-
petition a↵ects its financial health in line with the theoretical predictions of Diamond
2See the IATA annual report at http://www.iata.org/about/documents/iata-annual-review-2013-
en.pdf and “Why Airlines Make Such Meagre Profits?” The Economist - Feb 23rd 2014.
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(1991) and Brunnermeier and Yogo (2009).
Consistent with such an explanation, I find my results to be stronger for financially
constrained airlines since they are more exposed to liquidity risk. Additionally, I find
evidence supporting the hypothesis that incumbents exposed to the threat of entry lose
access to some segments of the debt market. Airlines finance themselves mainly with
three types of long-term debt: bank debt, bonds (or similar financial instruments) and
capital leasing. Threatened incumbents significantly reduce the proportion of bank debt
they hold (while the proportion of capital leasing does not change significantly). This
finding suggests that banks correctly anticipate low cost airlines’ entry and limit their
exposure to credit risk. Since bank debt has on average lower maturity than bonds,
this finding suggests that also limited access to credit a↵ects the observed increase in
the debt maturity of threatened airlines. Conversely, I do not find evidence supporting
alternative explanations such as those based on agency costs, strategic or signaling
behaviors.
This paper contributes to three streams of literature. First, an extensive theoretical
literature analyzes the optimal capital structure that firms should adopt to minimize
liquidity risk.3 In particular, Brunnermeier and Yogo (2009) argue that firms should
secure long-term financing just before their financial conditions worsen. Long-term
debt generally decreases a firm’s ability to readjust its maturity structure quickly in
response to changes in asset value. However, firms should trade o↵ the costs of liquidity
risk against the costs of reduced flexibility. Consistent with such a prediction, this paper
shows that an increase in the probability of a future negative shock pushes incumbents
to substitute short-term with long-term debt before the shock actually occurs. My
result is also consistent with the evidence from Graham and Harvey (2001)’s extensive
survey of 392 financial executives indicating that the cost of refinancing in “bad times”
3See, e.g., Morris (1976), Diamond (1991), Diamond (1993), and Brunnermeier and Yogo (2009).
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is the second most important factor a↵ecting the decision to issue long-term debt.
Second, a growing literature in finance explores empirically the e↵ect of product
market competition on payout policies (Grullon and Michaely (2007)), governance
(Giroud and Mueller (2010) and Giroud and Mueller (2011)), innovation (Aghion,
Bloom, Blundell, Gri th, and Howitt (2005)), leverage (MacKay and Phillips (2005),
Banerjee, Dasgupta, and Kim (2008), and Xu (2012)), investments (Akdog˘u and MacKay
(2008) and Fre´sard and Valta (2012)), cash holdings (Morellec, Nikolov, and Zucchi
(2013), He (2013)). The paper that is probably closer to mine in terms of its research
methodology is Khanna and Tice (2000). In that paper, the authors study the e↵ect of
Wal-Mart’s entrance in a local market on incumbents’ choice to expand/retreat. How-
ever, the e↵ect of competition on corporate debt maturity has not yet been explored.
Moreover, all of the above papers look at the e↵ect of competition on contemporaneous
corporate policies or focus on exogenous shocks, such as cuts in import tari↵s, that have
an immediate e↵ect on incumbent profitability. Conversely, my paper focuses on how
incumbents change their capital structure be f ore their profitability is a↵ected.4
Finally, this paper speaks to the literature discussing strategic entry deterrence and
accommodation. A large debate concerns whether deterrence actually makes sense,
since it forces a firm to deviate from its optimal strategy before this is actually needed
(i.e., before entry). My empirical finding that incumbents change debt structure before
actual entry is broadly consistent with a series of papers supporting the deterrence
argument (e.g., Dixit (1980); Aghion and Bolton (1987); and Milgrom and Roberts
(1982a)).
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 develops the theoretical pre-
4Probably the only comparable paper in this regard is Hoberg, Phillips, and Prabhala (2014). In
that paper the authors use product market fluidity to capture changes in rival firms’ products relative
to the firm’s products. They find that fluidity decreases firm propensity to make payouts via dividends
or repurchases and increases cash holdings, especially for firms with less access to financial markets.
However, they do not explore the e↵ect on debt maturity.
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dictions on the relation between the threat of entry and capital structure. Section
3 describes the data used. Section 4 briefly outlines the empirical design. Section 5
presents the main empirical results. Section 5 provides additional results. Section 6
concludes.
2 Threat of Entry and Capital Structure
In a testimony before the Subcommittee on Aviation on September 2002 Donald J.
Carty, American Airlines CEO, stated the following: “The challenge now for large
network carriers like American is to revise our business model not only to deal with our
old rivals, but (...) to prepare our company for long term success in an environment
where newer, lower cost competition represents a much bigger slice of the marketplace.5”
Since 2002 JetBlue has increased by almost 10 times its route presence, Allegiant
Air’s network has increased by 100 times and Southwest Airlines has introduced about
2000 new routes becoming the largest low cost carrier in the world (see Figure 1).
The rise of low cost carriers has intensified product market competition in an industry
that was already extremely competitive. In particular, it is reasonable to expect that
incumbents have adapted their financial structure to survive in a tougher environment.
In this paper, I explore the e↵ect of the threat of entry on financial decisions. The
following predictions derive from previous theoretical and empirical work on product
market competition and/or capital structure choices.
Prediction 1. Airlines exposed to the threat of entry decrease leverage
This prediction follows from Telser (1966), Bolton and Scharfstein (1990), Phillips
(1991), Chevalier (1995), Zingales (1998) and Campello (2003). Telser (1966), Bolton
and Scharfstein (1990) and Phillips (1991) derive theoretical predictions consistent with
5Testimony before the Subcommittee on Aviation, House Committee on Transportation and Infras-
tructure, September 24, 2002.
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the hypothesis that high leverage firms are easily driven out of business. Chevalier
(1995) shows that supermarket chains are more likely to enter into local markets where
incumbents undertook LBOs, Zingales (1998) finds that highly leveraged truck compa-
nies were less likely to survive to the 1980 deregulation, Campello (2003) shows that
leverage has a negative impact on sales growth in recession. Mixed empirical evidence
is found in Phillips (1995) and Khanna and Tice (2000). Predictions consistent with
the opposite argument, i.e., firms increase leverage to compete more aggressively, are
derived in Brander and Lewis (1986), Maksimovic (1988), and Rotenberg and Scharf-
stein (1990).
Prediction 2. Airlines exposed to the threat of entry increase debt maturity
Several economic explanations would be consistent with the above prediction. First,
an increase in debt maturity may be driven by agency costs. Myers (1977) argues that in
the presence of unexercised investment options managers may reject profitable projects
if a large part of the value created goes to debt holders. Firms can solve this problem by
frequently renegotiating their debt (e.g., issuing debt with shorter maturity). Future
competition shrinks firms’ investment opportunity set, reducing the risk of rejecting
profitable investment opportunities. This would encourage firms to issue more long-
term debt. If the threat of entry captures a reduction in the value of investment
options, I would expect to find no e↵ect of the threat of entry on debt maturity after
controlling for better proxies of growth prospects, i.e.,:
Prediction 2.1 The threat of entry has no e↵ect on debt maturity after controlling for
growth options
An alternative explanation consistent with prediction 2, would be that incumbents
commit to long-term financing in order to increase their operational flexibility. For
instance, managers may want to focus on competing more aggressively with the new
entrants instead of spending time and resources to manage debt refinancing. If that
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is the case, an increase of long-term debt may also work as a threat to set predatory
prices as a response to new entrants. Debt maturity is observable to new entrants and
this may be enough to discourage them from entering a route if entry triggers a fall
of prices below marginal costs (see, e.g, Areeda and Turner (1975) and Milgrom and
Roberts (1982b)). Under this hypothesis I should observe stronger price cuts when new
entrants enter into routes dominated by incumbents with more long-term debt:
Prediction 2.2 The price cut in response to entry increases in the debt maturity of
the incumbents
From incumbents’ perspective increasing debt maturity would also decrease liquid-
ity risk. Firms operating in tougher markets are more exposed to the risk of being
forced to ine cient liquidation when bad news arrives. This prediction follows from
Diamond (1991), Diamond (1993), and Brunnermeier and Yogo (2009). In particu-
lar, Brunnermeier and Yogo (2009) predict that firms should tradeo↵ greater financial
flexibility against lower liquidity risk costs before the financial health of the firm dete-
riorates. Under this hypothesis the response to the threat of entry should be driven by
financially constrained firms, since those are on average more exposed to rollover risk:
Prediction 2.3 Debt maturity increases more in the threat of entry for financially
constrained airlines
Yet, another possibility is that a change in the debt structure is enforced by lenders.
In the presence of perfect information the cost of borrowing should reflect the higher
credit risk for lenders associated to the threat of entry. Banks are probably the type
of lender with the highest incentive to gather information on borrowers given their
relatively higher exposure to each firm. Since bank debt has on average shorter maturity
than bonds (see Custo´dio, Ferreira, and Laureano (2013)), a reduced access to bank
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debt would result in longer debt maturity.6 In short:
Prediction 2.4 The proportion of bank debt decreases in the threat of entry
Alternative explanations are ruled out in Section 6.
3 Data
The sample used in my analysis is obtained from matching di↵erent data sources: Form
41 airlines data, the T-100 domestic market dataset, Compustat, and Capital IQ. The
final sample covers the years from 2000 to 2013. The sample starts in 2000 since two
of the main low cost airlines considered (Allegiant Air and JetBlue) started operations
around that year. Additionally, Capital IQ data is only available from 2000.
3.1 Airlines financial data
All airlines in the United States are required to file reports (commonly referred to as
form 41) including main balance sheet entries, employment data, fuel cost and consump-
tion, and operating expenses. This study uses data collected by the O ce of Airline
Information of the U.S. Department of Transportation. Airlines operating domestic
flights in the United States are also obliged to disclose data about all their flights to
the Department. I match airlines’ flights to other form 41 datasets using the variable
“airline ID.” Importantly, the sample is free from selection bias. The U.S. Department
of Transportation makes data available for all operating and defunct airlines for the
2000-2013 period.
To gather financial data I match airlines by name to Compustat. This reduces
significantly the sample since most of the airlines operating in the United States are
6The argument above assumes that banks are on average more informed than bondholders. However,
the same result would hold true in the presence of perfect information if bondholders charge a lower
price for the risk associated to the threat of entry because they can diversify it away in a large portfolio
of assets.
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private regional airlines that are not included in Compustat. However, financial data
available for such air carriers are less detailed and several variables needed for my
analysis are missing. To make sure that this selection is not a↵ecting my results, in
Section 6 I run similar regressions on the sample of all American domestic airlines using
only the financial information provided by form 41 filings.
The final sample includes 26 passenger airlines for a total of 245 observations.7
There airlines cover on average 81% of domestic passenger tra c. Results run on a
wider sample of airlines unmatched to Compustat using financial data from form 41
include 138 passenger airlines and 794 observations. In my analysis, I consider as the
main low cost airlines Southwest, JetBlue, Allegiant Air, and Frontier Airlines because
they satisfy the following requirements: their entry has a disruptive e↵ect on route
profitability, double airport presence is a strong predictor of actual entry, they increased
significantly their route network in the last decade.8 Results obtained using broader or
stricter definitions of low cost carriers are reported in the appendix.
3.2 Flight data
Data on flights are obtained from the T-100 domestic market dataset collected by the
Department of Transportation. These data have an important conceptual di↵erence
with the T-100 domestic segment dataset. The former considers a route to be a“market”
on the basis of its origin and destination airports, no matter how many stops occur in
7The airlines that make it into the final sample are: AirTran, Alaska Airlines, Allegiant Air, Amer-
ican Airlines, Big Sky Airlines, Continental, Delta, Era Aviation, ExpressJet, Frontier Airlines, Great
Lakes Airlines, Hawaiian Airlines, JetBlue, Mesa Airlines, Midway Airlines, Northwest, Pinnacle, Re-
public Airlines, SkyWest, Southwest, Spernak, US Airways, United Airlines, Vanguard, Virgin.
8Codeshare agreements and alliances could potentially bias my results since incumbents may not
react at all when the threat of entry arises from a “friendly” airline. However, such alliances are rare
for low cost airlines. Southwest entered in a codeshare agreement with AirTran in 2013. JetBlue has
several codeshare agreements with international carriers but none of these is included in my sample.
Allegiant has no alliances or agreements with other companies. Frontier has a codeshare agreement
with Great Lakes Airlines. However, dropping the “connected airlines” does not significantly alter the
results.
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between. The latter assumes that every stop breaks the flight into di↵erent markets,
e.g., flights taking o↵ from Boston Logan (BOS) for destination Santa Barbara (SBA)
with one stop in Phoenix (PHX) are considered one market by the T-100 domestic
market table, and two completely separate markets by the segment table (i.e., Boston
[BOS] - Phoenix [PHX] and Phoenix [PHX] - Santa Barbara [SBA]). In the paper I
present results using the first set of data. However, I obtain similar results using the
T-100 domestic segment dataset.
Another important distinction is between airports and cities. Computing routes
on the basis of airports assumes that two flights taking o↵ from the same airport but
landing in two di↵erent airports in the same city operate in completely di↵erent markets.
Conversely, computing routes on the basis of cities assumes that travelers are indi↵erent
to airports located in the same city.
Low cost airlines often do not operate in the main airport of a city but in a less
busy (and sometimes more peripheral) one. For instance, Southwest Airlines does not
fly from Chicago O’Hare, which is the main Chicago airport and one of the busiest
airports in the world by number of takeo↵s and landings. On the contrary, Southwest
operates in Chicago Midway a smaller airport situated 8 miles from Chicago downtown.
Therefore, in my analysis I determine routes on the basis of cities and not airports. For
instance, I assume that the route from the Logan Airport in Boston to Chicago O’Hare
would be a↵ected if Southwest starts flying from Boston Logan to Chicago Midway.
My flight sample is complete in the sense that every single domestic flight that
took o↵ in the 2000-2013 period is recorded. The matching of flight data with airlines’
financials is conducted by airline name as indicated above.
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3.3 Main financial variables
The main variables of interest considered in my analysis are Leverage and Debt Maturity.
I focus on book leverage since I want to avoid that a variation in the market value of
equity a↵ects my results. For instance, if markets correctly value the e↵ect of the threat
of entry on the future cash flows of the incumbents this would decrease the denominator
of the market leverage. As a result my results would suggest that incumbents increase
leverage even when in reality they keep leverage constant. This problem is solved
using book leverage. Summary statistics for Book Leverage are reported in Table 1.
The median airline is extremely highly leveraged: around 40%. This number is about
twice that reported by similar studies conducted on manufacturing firms (see, e.g., Xu
(2012)).
Debt Maturity is computed as the non-current part of long-term debt minus the
part of long-term debt maturing in either 2 or 3 years scaled by total debt. This
measure follows the literature on corporate debt maturity (e.g., Barclay and Smith
(1995); Custo´dio, Ferreira, and Laureano (2013)). Additionally, this measure better
captures the response of airlines to increasing liquidity risk compared to proxies based on
the average maturity of the debt instruments outstanding. In fact, when an incumbent
is exposed to the threat of entry the best strategy would be to minimize the proportion
of debt that will have to be refinanced when the low cost competitor actually enter the
market.9
The median airline displays about 67% of long-term debt maturing in more than
3 years. This number is on average decreasing over time similar to other American
industries (see Custo´dio, Ferreira, and Laureano (2013)). Results using alternative
9In particular, Diamond (1991) suggests that in equilibrium riskier firms should display intermediate
levels of debt maturity. In fact, they want to avoid to refinance short-term debt too often but are
excluded from the longest spectrum of debt maturity due to their riskiness. Consistent with this
argument, in the empirical analysis I test whether firms minimize the proportion of debt instruments
with the shortest maturities.
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proxies are provided. Results are also provided for a larger sample of public and private
airlines obtained using data from Form 41 financial filings. However, such data do not
provide information on the actual maturity of long-term debt. Hence, similar to Titman
and Wessels (1988) I define my proxy of debt maturity as non-current liabilities over
total total liabilities.
Details on the construction of other financial variables are provided in the appendix.
In my analysis I control for log Sales instead of Size since most of the variables are scaled
by book assets and I want to minimize the risk of mechanical correlation between the
variables. Summary statistics are reported in Table 1.
4 Empirical Design
The identification of an e↵ect of entry on capital structure presents some empirical
challenges including the following. First, the actual entry into a market is driven, among
other things, by the debt structure of the incumbents (see, e.g., Chevalier (1995) and
Lambrecht (2001)). There is rich theoretical and empirical support for the notion that
highly leveraged incumbents with a relevant portion of their debt to roll over in the near
future are less likely to respond aggressively to new entrants, e.g., starting a“price war.”
Hence, new firms are incentivized to enter markets dominated by firms having large
debts with short maturities. At the same time incumbents may lengthen debt maturity
and decrease leverage as a strategic response to entry. These two opposite e↵ects may
lead to biased estimates or cancel each other out when exploring the contemporaneous
relationship between competition and debt.
Second, the identification of direct competitors is problematic. Widely used clas-
sification standards include Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes, the North
American Industry Classification Standard (NAICS), and the Global Industry Clas-
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sification Standard (GICS) system. However, Lewellen (2012) shows that traditional
classification methods fail to properly map the product market space10 (see also Clarke
(1989) and Kahle and Walkling (1996) on the shortcomings arising from using standard
industry classification methodologies). Furthermore, such identification standards allow
for the construction of proxies for competition only at the aggregate industry level. It
is, however, an unrealistic assumption that all firms in the same industry are exposed
to the same degree of competition. Consistent with this claim, MacKay and Phillips
(2005) show that the position of a firm within an industry is much more relevant than
between-industry di↵erences in explaining financial leverage.
In this paper I exploit the result, provided in Goolsbee and Syverson (2008), that
Southwest’s airport presence is a strong predictor of actual route entry.11 Specifically,
when Southwest enters the second endpoint airport of a route but not the route itself,
the probability that it will enter the route “soon” increases dramatically (see Figure 2).
In this paper I generalize this approach to the four major low cost airlines in the United
States: Southwest Airlines, JetBlue, Allegiant Air, and Frontier Airlines.
Low-cost air carriers expanded their network significantly in my sample period, and
for each one of them presence at both endpoint airports of a route rises significantly
the probability of actual entry. I run probit regressions for the probability of a low
cost carrier’s actual entry into a route in year t+1, conditional on its presence at both
10As a general example consider two hypothetical restaurant chains, the first one operating only in
New York City and the second only in California. The California restaurant chain will not compete
directly with the restaurants in New York City because their customers are located in di↵erent states.
Hence, the opening of a new shop or a price adjustment will probably have no e↵ect on the policies of the
“rival.” However, traditional industry classification standards would typically group the two together
in a broad “restoration” category. Similarly, two airlines operating in completely di↵erent locations
would hardly influence one another. For instance, although they belong to the same industry, it is
unlikely that the financial decisions of Sierra Pacific Airlines are influenced by the sales of Alaska
Airlines, because they do not compete on any single route.
11Empirical work that has shown that endpoint airport presence is correlated with entry includes
Berry (1992) and Peteraf and Reed (1994), while Bailey (1981) describes a case where this approach
was used in antitrust policy. More broadly, the importance of airport presence is stressed in Borenstein
(1989) and Borenstein (1990).
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endpoints in year t. The sample of all possible routes is obtained from flight data.12
The marginal probabilities are reported in Table 2 for entry in year t+1, t+2, and t+3
(time fixed e↵ects are included and errors are clustered at the route level). Entry at
the second endpoint of a route increases the probability of entry in the following year
by 13% (Southwest), 8% (JetBlue), 13% (Allegiant) and 15% (Frontier). The marginal
probabilities for entry in year t+2 are 2%, 8%, 4% and 4%, respectively. The marginal
probabilities for entry in year t+3 are significantly smaller or not statistically significant.
The marginal probability of entry conditional on presence at one endpoint airport only
is also either significantly smaller or non-statistically significant.
These results suggest that incumbents can reasonably assess the probability of entry
of a low cost airline. However, entry into a single route would hardly disrupt incumbents’
profitability. Therefore, I aggregate such a measure of route threat at the airline/year
level. Importantly, I need to give a di↵erent weight to di↵erent routes since routes
with higher passenger tra c would be more important for an airline given the higher
number of paying passengers and the strategic nature of the route (for instance, routes
connecting to the hub have in general higher tra c). Data from the T-100 domestic
market dataset allow me to have information on the exact passenger tra c for each
airline/route/year. Hence, I define the threat of entry in the following way:





where Passengersk,i,t is the number of passengers for airline i, in year t, flying on
route k, while I(ThreatenedRoute)k,i,t is an indicator function that takes value of 1 if
12Following Goolsbee and Syverson (2008) I consider as potential routes only those where the low
cost airline enters at some point. This approach rules out routes where the airline will never realistically
enter. If I consider as potential routes all the routes in my sample, I would get smaller estimates but
still positive and significant coe cients. For the purposes of this paper the exact probability of entry
is however irrelevant. The only necessary conditions for my identification strategy to hold are that
entry when the low cost carrier operates at both endpoints of a route is significantly more likely and
that incumbents know this.
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route k is under threat in year t and takes value of zero otherwise. The measure above
goes from 0 to 1. A value of 0 indicates that no routes for airline i in year t are under
the threat of entry. A value of 1 indicates that all routes are under threat. In my
empirical analysis, I want to estimate the e↵ect of such a threat on financial policies.
However, some other empirical concerns need to be addressed. In particular, both
the decision of the low cost airline to enter the second endpoint of a route and the
change in the financial policy of the incumbent may be driven by an omitted variable.
Specifically, the main concern is that the profitability or the high passenger tra c of
the incumbent is driving both its decision to change capital structure and the decision
of the low cost carrier to enter the second endpoint airport of the incumbent’s most
profitable routes. To rule out such a concern it is important to control for incumbents’
tra c and profitability in my regressions. Conversely, reverse causality does not seem
to be an issue in this context since the change in capital structure of the incumbents
(i.e., less leverage and longer maturity) makes it less convenient for potential entrants
to choose to compete on the routes.13 Hence, if there is an e↵ect of the capital structure
on the decision of entering the airport this would work against my findings. Therefore,
I run the following regressions:
Leveragei,t = b(Threat o f Entryi,t)+ g0Xi,t +qt +Ji+ ei,t , (2)
DebtMaturityi,t = b(Threat o f Entryi,t)+ g0Xi,t +qt +Ji+ ei,t , (3)
where Threat o f Entryi,t is defined as in equation (1) and captures the exposure
of airline i in year t to the threat of entry, while Leveragei,t and Debt Maturityi,t are
defined as in section 3. Xi,t is a vector of time varying controls (including profitability
13Consistent with the previous argument, in unreported results I find that low cost airlines are less
likely to enter into routes where incumbents have lower leverage and longer debt maturity.
16
and passenger tra c) and qt and Ji are time and airline fixed. It is important that
both time and airline dummies are included since my analysis focuses on within airline
and cross-sectional variations in the threat of entry. Errors are clustered at the airline
level. This may potentially lead to underestimate standard errors due to the limited
number of clusters (26). To make sure this is not the case, I replicate my analysis using
block bootstrapping to estimate standard errors. The results are reported in Section 6.
5 Empirical Results
This section presents the main empirical results of the paper. The first part addresses
the channel through which capital structure is a↵ected. Sections 5.2 and 5.3 present
results for the e↵ect of the threat of entry on leverage and debt maturity, respectively.
5.1 Entry and route profitability
To understand why incumbents respond to the threat of entry, I first have to document
what are the e↵ects of actual entry in my sample. To do so, I exploit the Domestic
Airline Consumer Airfare Reports issued by the Department of Transportation. Average
fares are computed using data from the Bureau of Transportation Statistics’ Passenger
Origin and Destination (OD) Survey, a 10% random sample of all airline tickets for U.S.
carriers, excluding charter air travel. Fares are based on the total ticket value, which
consists of the price charged by the airlines plus any additional taxes and fees levied by
an outside entity at the time of purchase. Fares include only the price paid at the time
of the ticket purchase and do not include other fees paid at the airport or on-board the
aircraft. Averages do not include frequent-flyer or “zero fares” or a few abnormally high
reported fares. The inflation adjustment is calculated using dollars for the most recent
year of air fare data.
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Low cost airlines’ entry into a route has a disruptive e↵ect on ticket prices.14 Table
3 shows coe cients for average ticket prices regressed on a dummy variable that takes
value of one when a low cost airline actually enters into a route (and until it stays in)
and value of zero otherwise. More precisely, the dependent variable is: the average fare
charged by air carriers operating on a given route recorded in the last quarter of the
year. Results obtained using fares charged by only the largest carrier operating on the
route are similar and are reported in the appendix. In my regressions I include time
and route fixed e↵ects and I cluster errors at the route level.
It seems clear that entry has a dramatic e↵ect on the profitability of the route.
Average fares drop by around 6% when a low cost airline starts operations on a route.
More specifically, average fares drop by 5% when Southwest enters. The drop is 20%,
6%, and 4% for JetBlue, Allegiant and Frontier, respectively. I have no data on profit
margins. However, external sources indicate that the average profit margin in the
industry is around 1%.15 Such a disruptive e↵ect on route profitability suggests that
airlines should try to preempt entry or, at the very least, seek to increase their financial
flexibility in order to increase their chances of survival in a tougher market.
5.2 Threat of Entry and Leverage
A way to make a firm better suited for survival in a more competitive market would be
to decrease the burden of debt: highly leveraged firms are easily pushed out of the mar-
ket (Zingales (1998), less likely to expand (Khanna and Tice (2000)), and more likely to
pass-up positive NPV projects (Myers (1977)). Additionally, new competitors prefer to
enter markets dominated by high leveraged incumbents (Chevalier (1995)). The above
14The e↵ects of Southwest’s entry on prices are well known (see, e.g., Morrison (2001)). More
generally, there is consensus concerning the notion that competition hurts firms’ profitability (Tirole
(2010)) and increases the riskiness of firms’ cash flows (Raith (2003); Gaspar and Massa (2006); Irvine
and Ponti↵ (2009)).
15See IATA annual report at http://www.iata.org/about/documents/iata-annual-review-2013-en.pdf
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considerations suggest that a firm would be better o↵ reducing leverage before new
competitors enter the same market. Importantly, the threat of entry does not a↵ect in
any way incumbents’ profitability (in unreported results I find the correlation between
threat of entry and incumbents’ profitability to be positive and non-statistically signif-
icant). Hence, threatened airlines would be better o↵ changing their capital structure
before competition actually a↵ects their cash flows. Conversely, Brander and Lewis
(1986), Maksimovic (1988), and Rotenberg and Scharfstein (1990) derive opposite pre-
dictions, e.g., firms should increase leverage under the threat of greater competition
committing to a greater output stance.
Table 4 reports the coe cients estimated running specification (2). Threat of entry
has the expected sign of the coe cient in the case of book leverage (consistent with
prediction 1). However, I fail to reject the hypothesis that the coe cients are statisti-
cally di↵erent from zero (t-statistic of -0.94 in the full model specification). The results
using market leverage are even more mixed (see columns from 4 to 6), however this is
probably driven by the fact that the market value of the stock may already incorpo-
rate the e↵ect of potential entry on future cash flows (which may work in the opposite
direction).
The full model specification controls for Sales, Pro f itability, Tangibility, Asset Maturity,
the log number of paying passengers, Tobin’s Q, airline and time fixed e↵ects. Coe -
cients have the expected signs, Sales (used as a proxy of size) and Tangibility are both
positively and strongly correlated with Leverage (as it should be according to previous
literature see, e.g., Harris and Raviv (1991); Rajan and Zingales (1998)). Tobin’s Q
has the “wrong” sign in specification (3), but the sign flips if I drop airline dummies. Q
has the expected negative sign in specification (6) (see, e.g., Myers (1977)). The trade-
o↵ theory predicts a positive relation between book leverage and profitability because
higher profitability corresponds to higher benefits of debt and lower costs of financial
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distress. For market leverage, the tradeo↵ theory does not have a definite prediction
since firm value also increases with profitability. Consistently, in my results a find a pos-
itive correlation between profitability and book leverage and non-statistically significant
relation between profitability and market leverage.
Consistent with previous papers, my results suggest that there are multiple con-
siderations that a↵ect the relation between leverage and competition. Hence, the high
heterogeneity in the response to expected competition leads to reject the prediction of
a negative relation between the threat of entry and leverage.
Importantly, my setting is di↵erent from that of Xu (2012). In that paper the author
estimates the impact of import reductions, instrumented by tari↵ cuts, on leverage.
However, tari↵ reductions have an immediate negative e↵ect on the profitability of
domestic firms. Hence, Xu (2012) uses such reduction as an instrument for testing the
impact of profitability on leverage. In my setting the threat of entry has no immediate
e↵ect on the profitability of incumbents (the correlation between threat of entry and
profitability is positive even though not statistically significant). Therefore, in my
analysis I simply rule out that expected competition has on average an e↵ect on leverage.
Results for the e↵ect of actual entry on leverage are reported in section 6.
5.3 Threat of Entry and Debt Maturity
Firms borrow short-term to readjust their maturity structure more quickly in response
to changes in asset values (Brunnermeier and Yogo (2009)), to attenuate the “debt
overhang problem” (Myers (1977)), to signal to the market that they are underpriced
(see, e.g., Flannery (1986)), or because a rat race among lenders leads toward shorter
and shorter maturity (Brunnermeier and Oehmke (2013)), However, failure to rollover
debt has a cost. In particular, subsequent to rollover failure firms will have to go
through debt restructuring that can be costly for three reasons. First, owners of bonds
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are dispersed and di cult to locate (Buchheit and Gultai (2002)). Second, firms will
have to seek more expensive sources of financing. Third, firms may be forced to liquidate
assets at fire sale prices (Pulvino (1998); Shleifer and Vishny (2011)).
Hence, airlines under the threat of entry are potentially better o↵ borrowing long-
term to reduce liquidity risk costs. Additionally, the threat of increasing competition
will also a↵ect the investment opportunity set of incumbents or the willingness of lenders
to provide further financing. This section explores the e↵ect of the threat of entry on
debt maturity and provides suggestive evidence on the economic drivers of such a result.
Table 5 shows the e↵ect of the threat of entry posed by low cost carriers on cor-
porate debt maturity. An increase of one-standard deviation in the threat of entry
leads to a 5.4% increase in the proportion of long-term debt maturing after 3 years.
This e↵ect is significant at the 1% (t-statistic of 3.19 in specification (3)). Columns
from 1 to 3 provide results including both airlines and time fixed e↵ects but without
controlling for the term spread (which would be collinear with the time dummies). In
the specifications run in columns from 4 to 6, I include term spread and I drop the time
dummies. Errors are clustered at the airline level, results obtained bootstrapping stan-
dard errors are provided in Section 6. The coe cients estimated for the threat of entry
do not change dramatically in the di↵erent specifications. Controls have the expected
signs: Sales is positively correlated with debt maturity since bigger and more success-
ful firms can borrow at longer maturities; Pro f itability, Tangibility, and Asset Maturity
have all positive coe cients (consistent with previous empirical work on debt maturity
see, e.g., Barclay and Smith (1995), Guedes and Opler (1996), and Stohs and Mauer
(1996)). However, they become not statistically significant when I include airline fixed
e↵ects, possibly because they do not display high within-firm variation. Term Spread is
negatively correlated with debt maturity since firms prefer to borrow short-term when
short-term rates are relatively lower than long-term rates (i.e., when the yield curve has
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a more positive slope).
Tobin’s Q is a first proxy of airlines’ value of investment opportunities and, as
expected, is negatively correlated with debt maturity (see Myers (1977)). However,
the estimated coe cient for threat of entry is not a↵ected by the inclusion of Q. This
finding suggests that the e↵ect of future competition on current debt maturity is not
driven by the reduction in the value of the investment opportunities for the incumbent.
Other proxies of investment opportunities are considered in Table 6.
A first concern with the previous results is however that the e↵ect on debt maturity
is not driven by new long-term debt but by some debt issues occurred in the past. To
rule out such a possibility, I replicate my analysis using as dependent variable Newly
Issued Long  term Debt. This variable captures the amount of long-term debt that has
just been issued (i.e., at time t) and it is scaled by the total amount of book assets to
make sure that the result is not driven by the shrinking of the denominator. Results
are reported in Table 6 (columns from 1 to 3). The estimated coe cients are lower
than those reported in Table 5, since the denominator of the dependent variable is in
general bigger, but the results suggest that airlines exposed to the threat of entry issue
new long-term debt.
However, such results may be driven by failure to control for other important factors
such as the exposure to oil price, the rating of the debt, the value of the collateral, the
relations with employees, or the fact that some airlines are in distress.16 Results in
Table 6 account for such variables. In particular, a series of papers suggests that the
liquidation value of the collateral may play a relevant role in the ability of a firm to
finance itself (Benmelech (2008), Benmelech and Bergman (2009), and Benmelech and
Bergman (2011)). In my sample I do not have information on the liquidation value of
16As an alternative proxy for distress, I use a dummy variable that takes value of one when an airline
files for Chapter 11 protection and value of zero otherwise. Results are anyway similar and Chapter
11 airlines are actually a subset of the airlines in financial distress in my sample.
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the collateral but I use the dollar value of total equipment owned (this number includes
also leased planes) by the airline as a rough proxy of it. Consistent with Benmelech
and Bergman (2009), I find a positive correlation between debt maturity and Equipment
Owned. Additionally, I find a negative and significant correlation between Debt Maturity
and a trend variable. This finding is consistent with the average downward trend in
the maturity of liabilities observed in most of American industries (see, e.g., Custo´dio,
Ferreira, and Laureano (2013); Harford, Klasa, and Maxwell (2014)). Following Pulvino
(1998) I additionally include as controls COST , i.e., cost of goods sold over available
seats, and LoadFactor, computed as the the percentage of seats occupancy from 41
form filings times operative income before depreciation over the number of passengers.
It is still debated in the literature whether measures such as Tobin’s Q are flawed since
they measure average rather than marginal firm prospects. The measures proposed
by Pulvino (1998) capture firms’ abilities to generate future cash flows. In particular,
the former provides a measure of airlines’ abilities to fill their planes with high-revenue
passengers. The second provides a proxy of airlines’ cost e ciencies. However, those
variables are non-statically significant in my regressions. Estimated coe cients for other
variables such as Fuel expenditures, the number of employees, the rating or the distress
status are not statically di↵erent from zero as well.
The results presented above suggest that airlines under the threat of entry increase
the proportion of long-term debt, substituting short-term debt with longer maturity
debt instruments. In general, this result does not seem to be driven by a change of the
investment opportunities of the incumbents since this e↵ect survives to the inclusion of
proxies such as Q, Load Factor or COST . An alternative explanation for this finding
would be that airlines issue long-term debt so that they can divert resources that would
otherwise go to service the debt (e.g., to pay it back) into maintaining lower prices. The
choice of issuing long-term debt would therefore signal that the incumbent is committed
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to engage in a price war if actual entry occurs. Under this hypothesis, I should observe
that prices are cut more aggressively when low cost airlines enter into routes dominated
by incumbents holding more long-term debt. To test this prediction, I consider only
observations at the route level for which I have entry of a low cost carrier in year t and
financial data for all incumbents operating on the same route in year t-1. Therefore,
I regress the average price cut on the average previous year financial characteristics of
incumbents operating in the same route weighted by passenger tra c. If the change
in debt maturity were driven by strategic behaviors, I would expect to find a positive
correlation between Debt Maturity and Price Cut. However, this is not the case. I
find a significant negative correlation between Leverage and Price Cut and a positive
correlation between Cash Holdings and Price Cut suggesting that low leveraged and
cash-rich firms are more likely to engage into price wars (consistent with Bolton and
Scharfstein (1990), Chevalier (1995) and Fre´sard (2010)). However, I do not find a
significant impact of Debt Maturity on prices. Similar results are found using Delta
Debt Maturity instead of Debt Maturity.
Another possible driver of the decision to reach for longer maturities may be rollover
(or liquidity) risk. A capital structure that implies frequent debt rollover may lead to
ine cient liquidation in a market characterized by tough price competition (Diamond
(1991)). In this case I would expect to find that the firms with higher liquidation costs
(e.g., firms that have more di culties in finding alternative sources of financing) should
display a stronger reaction to the threat of entry. In my analysis I assume that smaller
and financially constrained firms have higher liquidation costs due to larger information
asymmetries, reduced access to capital markets, and lack of internal sources of funding.
Therefore, I split my sample in two using first Size (i.e., airlines with book value of
assets below the median versus airlines with book value of assets above the median)
and then the SA index developed by Hadlock and Pierce (2010) (I compare airlines with
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above median values of the SA index with airline below the median).17
Table 8 shows that my results on Debt Maturity are about 4 times stronger in the
samples of small/financially constrained airlines. Conversely, even splitting the sample
I do not find a significant e↵ect for threat on entry on Leverage. The debt maturity
result is consistent with explanations based on the minimization of liquidity risk. Yet,
another possibility (not mutually exclusive with liquidity risk based explanations) is
that the e↵ect of the threat of entry on debt maturity is the result of a limited access
to credit markets. The relevant questions in this case are whether lenders realize that
borrowers are potentially exposed to increasing competition in the future and whether
they price their debt accordingly. If that were the case, I would expect banks to cut
funding more severely in response to such a threat. In fact, banks are on average more
exposed to each client than bondholders are (bondholders can include airlines’ debt in
a large diversified portfolio where the contribution of idiosyncratic risk to the overall
portfolio’s risk goes to zero) and they on average closely monitor their clients, which
should decrease information asymmetries.
Therefore, I would expect banks to either charge a higher price for lending (i.e.,
making ceteris paribus more convenient for airlines to issue bonds) or to reduce risk
through the collateral channel forcing an increase in the proportion of secured debt.
Another possibility for the airline would be to change the proportion of capital leases.
Under Section 1110 of U.S. bankruptcy code, capitalized leased obligations are essen-
tially treated as “senior” debt. Under Section 1110, aircraft lessors are relieved from
automatic stay provisions that a↵ect most creditors during Chapter 11 proceedings;
lessors have the right to seize “collateral” 60 days after the lessee violates the lease
contract. Yet, the threat of entry implies that with high probability the market share
17The SA index is computed as a linear combination of Age, Size, and Size squared. Hadlock and
Pierce (2010) show that such a measure is better suited in identifying financially constrained firms
than alternative measures such as the KZ index.
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of the incumbents is going to decrease in the future reducing the need to lease planes.
Results in Table 9 show the e↵ect of the threat of entry on the proportion of bank
debt, secured debt, and capital leasing, respectively. I fail to reject the null hypothesis
of no e↵ect for the threat of entry on secured debt and leasing possibly due to the
limited sample size. However, the e↵ect on bank debt is negative and significant. A
one standard deviation increase in the threat of entry leads to a reduction of roughly
4% in the proportion of bank debt. This result suggests that lenders play a role in the
change of debt structure that follows the threat of entry posed by low cost carriers.
Overall, my results show that the threat of entry a↵ects debt maturity (but not
leverage). Further analysis provides empirical evidence suggestive of explanations based
on liquidity risk management and limited access to shorter-maturity bank debt.
6 Further results
6.1 Full sample results
Table 10 presents results using the full sample of airlines filing form 41 financial data.
In particular, I replicate my analysis without matching form 41 data to Compustat.
As a result the number of available variables is reduced. I define Debt Maturity as
Non-current liabilities over Non-current liabilities plus current liabilities. Leverage is
Total Liabilities over Total Assets. I control for log Total Assets instead of Log Sales
(since the latter is not available); Pro f itability is Net Income over total assets; and Load
Factor is computed as the percentage of seats filled times Net Income over passengers.
Some observations display a value of liabilities significantly higher than the value of
the assets. To avoid that extreme observations (e.g., severely distressed airlines) are
biasing the analysis I simple drop observations for which the book value of the liabilities
is greater than the book value of assets.
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My sample now includes 138 passenger airlines for the time interval 1991-2013. As
expected Threat o f Entry is significantly lower before 2000 since Jetblue and Allegiant
are not jet in the sample. Results are reported for the full sample (column 1), the
time interval 2001-2013 (column 2), the time interval 1991-2000 (column 3), the full
specification without time dummies but including Term Spread and Trend (column 4).
In all specifications the coe cients estimated for the Threat o f Entry are positive and
significant. The economic magnitude is somehow smaller than that found in Table
5. However, this can be due to the fact that debt maturing in either 2 or 3 years is
considered short-term debt in the specification run in Table 5 and long-term debt in
the one run in Table 10. The coe cients estimated for the e↵ect of the Threat o f Entry
on Leverage and Cash Holdings are not statistically significant (see columns 5 and 6).
6.2 Entry
Table 11 presents results for actual entry of low cost carriers on Leverage and Newly
Issued Long  term Debt. I consider Newly Issued Long  term Debt instead of the
standard definition of Maturity because the latter would be positively correlated with
Entry even if long-term debt with maturity longer than 4 years were issued at time
t-1. Conversely, the former measure captures the proportion of long-term debt issued
when actual entry occurs. Low cost carriers are excluded from my analysis. I reject the
hypothesis that actual entry triggers a change in the capital structure of the incumbents.
6.3 Cluster Bootstrap
Most of corporate variables display some form of cluster correlation. Bias in standard
errors can be conveniently avoided with cluster-robust estimators. However, clustered
standard errors can themselves be biased if the number of clusters is small. This is
potentially the case in my analysis due to the limited number of matched airlines (26).
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Donald and Lang (2007) show that Wald statistics obtained from standard methods
such as OLS are not normally distributed when the number of clusters is small. There-
fore, results are presented throughout the paper using a t-distribution with G-1 de-
grees of freedom (where G is the number of clusters). Additionally, Cameron, Gelbach,
and Miller (2008) show that cluster bootstrap estimation can mitigate few-cluster bias
(contrary to standard bootstrapping that only corrects for heteroskedasticity). This
approach draws blocks of observations instead of single ones, in order to preserve the
existing correlation structure within each block while using the independence across
blocks to consistently estimate the standard errors.18 Therefore, I construct 200 boot-
strap samples drawing from 26 blocks (i.e., the di↵erent airlines) from the original
sample. Results are presented in Table 12, estimated t-statistics are similar to those
reported in Table 5.
6.4 Exit
Table 14 documents the e↵ect of low cost airlines’ exit from a route on debt maturity.
Coe cients of Exit have a negative sign but they are not statistically significant. How-
ever, some caveats are in order. The four low cost airlines considered in the empirical
analysis went through an impressive expansion in the last decade. Route exits in this
period are rare. The variable Exit, which captures the percentage of routes for each
incumbent from which low cost airlines are exiting the market, display extremely low
mean (4%) and an even lower median (2.9%). Additionally, I cannot rule out that a
(possible) debt maturity adjustment occurs at di↵erent times for di↵erent airlines, in-
creasing the noise in my estimates. Finally, Exit is subjected to the same endogeneity
concerns as the variable Entry.
18See also Giroud, Mueller, Stomper, and Westerkamp (2011) for an application in a finance setting.
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7 Conclusion
The e↵ect of competition on economic variables has been extensively debated. Sev-
eral papers have shown that the competitive environment has major implications for
corporate policies, and both empirical and theoretical work claims that the financial
structure of firms influences how competition evolves. This paper looks for a causal
e↵ect of expected competition on financing choices. More specifically, the question ad-
dressed by this paper is whether firms react to the threat of competition by increasing
corporate debt maturity.
The setting of this paper is the U.S. domestic airline industry. Today the role
of competition has important implications, especially for airlines since the industry
is becoming increasingly concentrated due to mergers, e.g., Delta-Northwest (2009),
United-Continental (2010), Southwest-AirTran (2011), American Airlines-US Airways
(2013) as well as alliances and codeshare agreements between companies that were
competitors in the past.
However, airlines have some attractive features that make it possible to build a
more precise identification strategy than similar studies based on all Compustat firms,
and potentially to generalize some of the findings to other sectors. The largest part of
the literature on competition focuses on broad proxies of industry sectors to identify
competing firms and generally assumes that all firms within an industry are exposed
to the same level of competition or to the same shocks. However, MacKay and Phillips
(2005) indicate that most of the financial structure of firms is explained by within-
industry di↵erences. Additionally, the related literature looks at the e↵ect of actual
competition on corporate variables and not at the “threat” of future competition.
This paper proposes an identification strategy based on the threat of competition
posed by low cost carriers network expansion, while it exploits data on flight routes to
identify which airlines are actual competitors within the airline industry. I find compe-
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tition to have strong implications for the maturity of corporate debt. Airlines exposed
to tougher future competition increase the proportion of long-term liabilities and re-
duce the proportion of short-term ones. This result is driven by liquidity risk concerns
and limited access to shorter-term bank debt. Overall, my findings support the claim
that the financial structure has deep implications for the competitive environment and
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Figure 1: The rise of low cost airlines: This figure displays the cumulative number of new routes
added by low cost carriers since 2000. Low cost carriers are Southwest Airlines, JetBlue, Allegiant Air
and Frontier Airlines.
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Table 1: Summary statistics
This table provides descriptive statistics for a sample of 26 domestic airlines in the years from 2000 to
2013. Threat o f Entry measures the percentage of routes under the threat of entry by low cost carriers
weighted by the number of passengers. Sales is the total sales in thousand of dollars. Pro f itability is
operative income before depreciation over book assets. Tangibility is Property, Plat and Equipment
over book assets. Asset Maturity is current assets over current assets plus Property, Plat and Equipment
times current assets over cost of goods sold, plus Property, Plat and Equipment over current assets plus
Property, Plat and Equipment times Property, Plat and Equipment over depreciation and amortization.
Q is book assets plus market equity minus book equity over book assets.
Mean 25th percentile Median 75th percentile Standard deviation
Threat of Entry 0.162 0.028 0.092 0.250 0.183
Book Leverage 0.402 0.255 0.395 0.532 0.222
Market Leverage 0.341 0.206 0.341 0.478 0.191
Maturity 0.593 0.507 0.665 0.761 0.253
Profitability 0.075 0.031 0.081 0.115 0.136
Tangibility 0.560 0.470 0.578 0.680 0.177
Asset Maturity 9.87 6.06 9.56 12.43 5.38
Q 1.343 1.019 1.173 1.448 0.564
Sales 6291 781 1970 11415 8012
Cash Holdings 0.130 0.050 0.100 0.196 0.107
New Long term debt 0.070 0.002 0.040 0.100 0.089
Bank debt 0.371 0.074 0.219 0.687 0.341
Secured debt 0.767 0.638 0.875 0.984 0.276
Capital leasing 0.081 0.012 0.039 0.099 0.132
Fuel 19.8 19.0 20.1 21.0 2.30
Rating 0.510 0.000 1.000 1.000 0.501
Collateral 14.21 12.63 14.27 15.89 1.85
Employees 21.57 3.61 8.92 37.25 24.33
Distress 0.257 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.438
Adjusted Load factor 0.184 0.026 0.092 0.186 1.041
COST 0.708 0.060 0.086 0.142 4.339
40
Table 2: Probability of Entry
This table presents the results from a probit regression in which the dependent variable takes the value
of one if a low cost carrier entered into a route in year t+1, t+2, or t+3 conditional on being present
at both endpoint airports (but not in the route itself) for the first time in year t. Marginal e↵ects
are reported. The routes considered are obtained from the T-100 Domestic Market database. Year
fixed e↵ects are always included. Errors are clustered at the route level. t-statistics are reported in
parentheses.
Probability of Entry in Year:
t+1 t+2 t+3
Entry at the second endpoint of the route for:
Southwest Airlines 0.13 0.02 0.00
(15.48) (2.52) (0.45)
JetBlue 0.08 0.08 0.01
(5.22) (5.31) (0.65)
Allegiant Air 0.13 0.04 0.02
(13.93) (4.14) (2.27)
Frontier Airlines 0.15 0.04 0.02
(14.18) (4.20) (1.72)
Table 3: Low cost Airlines Entry and Route profitability
The dependent variable in the regressions is the log of the average route ticket prices. Entry is a
dummy variable that takes value of one if at least one low cost airline operates on the route and takes
value of zero otherwise. Results for only Southwest (or Jetblue, Allegiant, Frontier, respectively) are
also reported. Average fares are adjusted for inflation and are obtained from the U.S. Department of
Transportation Statistics’ Passenger Origin and Destination (OD) Survey, a 10% sample of all airline
tickets sold by U.S. carriers, excluding charter air travel. Average fares are average prices paid by all
fare paying passengers. They cover first class fares paid to carriers o↵ering such service but do not
cover free tickets, such as those awarded by carriers o↵ering frequent flyer programs. Time and route
fixed e↵ects are included and errors are clustered at the route level.
Dependent Variable: Log Ticket Price
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)










Route Fixed E↵ects Y Y Y Y Y
Year Fixed E↵ects Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 75525 75525 75525 75525 75525
R-squared 0.8648 0.8642 0.8643 0.864 0.8638
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Table 4: Does the Threat of Entry a↵ect Leverage?
The dependent variables in the regressions are book leverage (columns 1 to 3) computed as total debt
over total book assets, and market leverage (columns 4 to 6) computed as total debt over book assets
plus market value of equity minus book value of equity. Threat o f Entry measures the percentage
of routes under the threat of entry by low cost carriers weighted by the number of passengers and
is defined in section 4. Log Sales is the log of dollar sales. Pro f itability is operative income before
depreciation over book assets. Tangibility is Property, Plat and Equipment over book assets. Asset
Maturity is current assets over current assets plus Property, Plat and Equipment times current assets
over cost of goods sold, plus Property, Plat and Equipment over current assets plus Property, Plat and
Equipment times Property, Plat and Equipment over depreciation and amortization. Paying Passengers
is log passengers. Q is book assets plus market value of equity minus book equity over book assets.
Accounting variables are winsorized at the 1% level. All regressions include an intercept (not reported)
and year and airline dummies where specified. Errors are clustered at the airline level. t-statistics are
reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.
Dependent Variable: Book Leverage Market Leverage
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Threat of Entry -0.0941 -0.0921 -0.0708 0.0131 0.0061 -0.0121
(-0.88) (-0.87) (-0.68) (0.19) (0.09) (-0.18)
Log Sales -0.0008 0.0034 0.1022** 0.0885** 0.0761* 0.0794**
(-0.02) (0.05) (2.09) (2.09) (1.96) (2.32)
Profitability 0.3732*** 0.3658** 0.3385*** -0.0874 -0.0611 -0.0463
(2.97) (2.40) (2.90) (-1.07) (-0.78) (-0.52)
Tangibility 0.4044* 0.4119* 0.6409*** 0.5226*** 0.4903*** 0.4372***
(1.85) (1.91) (2.94) (4.05) (3.59) (3.05)
Asset Maturity 0.0053 0.0050 0.0004 -0.0008 0.0004 0.0008
(1.10) (1.19) (0.10) (-0.23) (0.11) (0.22)
Paying Passengers -0.0057 0.0010 0.0236 0.0217
(-0.15) (0.05) (1.31) (1.31)
Q 0.0927** -0.0547**
(2.36) (-2.42)
Airline Fixed E↵ects Y Y Y Y Y Y
Time Fixed E↵ects Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 234 234 184 184 184 184
R-squared 0.596 0.596 0.810 0.855 0.857 0.866
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Table 5: Does the Threat of Entry a↵ect Debt Maturity?
The dependent variable in the regressions is Debt Maturity computed as non-current Long-term debt
minus long-term debt maturing in 2 and 3 years over total debt. Threat o f Entry measures the
percentage of routes under the threat of entry by low cost carriers weighted by the number of passengers.
Log Sales is the log of dollar sales. Pro f itability is operative income before depreciation over book
assets. Tangibility is Property, Plat and Equipment over book assets. Asset Maturity is current assets
over current assets plus Property, Plat and Equipment times current assets over cost of goods sold, plus
Property, Plat and Equipment over current assets plus Property, Plat and Equipment times Property,
Plat and Equipment over depreciation and amortization. Paying Passengers is log passengers. Q is book
assets plus market value of equity minus book equity over book assets. Term Spread is the di↵erence
between the yield on ten-year government bonds and the yield on three-month government bonds
disclosed by the Federal Reserve. Accounting variables are winsorized at the 1% level. All regressions
include an intercept (not reported) and year and airline dummies where specified. Errors are clustered
at the airline level. t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at the
10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.
Dependent variable: Debt Maturity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Threat of Entry 0.2813*** 0.2823*** 0.2964*** 0.2113** 0.2097** 0.3740***
(2.98) (2.91) (3.19) (2.37) (2.29) (4.16)
Log Sales 0.1050* 0.1066** 0.1876** 0.0871* 0.0788 0.1120*
(1.80) (2.15) (2.11) (2.03) (1.52) (1.87)
Profitability 0.1188 0.1157 0.3482 0.0889 0.1016 0.2323
(0.37) (0.39) (1.11) (0.33) (0.39) (0.78)
Tangibility 0.0636 0.0663 0.2504 0.0436 0.0259 0.1774
(0.18) (0.18) (0.76) (0.16) (0.09) (0.71)
Asset Maturity 0.0051 0.0050 0.0005 0.0060 0.0064 0.0023
(0.81) (0.72) (0.06) (0.99) (0.97) (0.31)
Paying Passengers -0.0022 -0.0327 0.0122 -0.0304
(-0.05) (-1.55) (0.24) (-1.51)
Q -0.1016** -0.0659
(-2.14) (-1.59)
Term Spread -0.0207** -0.0206** -0.0242**
(-2.15) (-2.17) (-2.33)
Airline Fixed E↵ects Y Y Y Y Y Y
Time Fixed E↵ects Y Y Y N N N
Observations 203 203 161 203 203 161
R-squared 0.634 0.634 0.710 0.614 0.614 0.686
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Table 6: Robustness: Does the Threat of Entry a↵ect Debt Maturity?
The dependent variables in the regressions are Debt Maturity, computed as non-current Long-term debt
minus long-term debt maturing in 2 and 3 years over total debt, and Newly Issued Long  term Debt,
computed as newly issued long-term debt over book assets. Threat o f Entry measures the percentage
of routes under the threat of entry by low cost carriers weighted by the number of passengers. Log
Sales is the log of dollar sales. Pro f itability is operative income before depreciation over book assets.
Paying Passengers is log passengers. Q is book assets plus market value of equity minus book equity
over book assets. Term Spread is the di↵erence between the yield on ten-year government bonds and
the yield on three-month government bonds disclosed by the Federal Reserve. The other variables are
defined in the appendix. Accounting variables are winsorized at the 1% level. All regressions include
an intercept (not reported) and year and airline dummies where specified. Errors are clustered at the
airline level. t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%
and 1%, respectively.
Dependent Variable: Newly Issued Long-Term Debt Debt Maturity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Threat of Entry 0.1386*** 0.1204* 0.0941* 0.2248** 0.2186** 0.2068** 0.2530***
(2.88) (2.05) (1.95) (2.53) (2.69) (2.52) (3.68)
Log Sales -0.0561** -0.0323 -0.0355 0.1184 0.1498* 0.1683** 0.2498***
(-2.21) (-0.81) (-1.40) (1.16) (2.06) (2.34) (3.91)
Profitability 0.1418** 0.1444* 0.1123 0.2194 0.1101 0.0736 -0.1255
(2.44) (1.81) (1.51) (0.80) (0.43) (0.30) (-0.43)
Tangibility -0.0522 -0.0157 -0.0037 -0.2258 -0.1386 -0.1875 -0.3231
(-0.52) (-0.15) (-0.03) (-0.99) (-0.52) (-0.70) (-1.60)
Asset Maturity 0.0044 0.0025 0.0015 0.0010 -0.0001 -0.0010 0.0013
(1.38) (0.60) (0.33) (0.09) (-0.01) (-0.09) (0.15)
Paying Passenegrs 0.0179* 0.0166 0.0124 -0.0840** -0.0736* -0.2099* -0.2242*
(1.74) (1.39) (0.76) (-2.66) (-1.82) (-1.79) (-2.05)
Q -0.0155 -0.0114 -0.0186 0.0017 -0.0020 -0.0118
(-1.14) (-0.80) (-0.28) (0.02) (-0.03) (-0.16)
Fuel -0.2568 -0.2587 -0.1113 -0.1208
(-0.85) (-0.91) (-0.44) (-0.68)
Rating 0.3469 0.3405 0.3541 0.3060
(1.38) (1.37) (1.37) (1.30)
Equipment Owned 0.1546** 0.1364** 0.1716*** 0.1906**
(2.25) (2.40) (3.35) (2.89)
Employees -0.0285 0.0363 -0.0616
(-0.22) (0.25) (-0.55)
Distress -0.0791 -0.0650 -0.0676
(-0.87) (-0.68) (-1.03)








Airline Fixed E↵ects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Time Fixed E↵ects Y Y N Y Y Y N
Observations 234 184 184 146 146 146 146
R-squared 0.405 0.378 0.296 0.756 0.760 0.763 0.752
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Table 7: Does long Debt Maturity lead to Price Wars?
The dependent variable in the regressions is Price Cut computed as minus the change of average ticket
price for a given route. The observations are at the route-year level. Only routes/year for which there
is entry of at least one low cost airline are included. Only observations for which financials for all
carriers operating on the same route in the previous year are available are included. Leverage is the
average leverage of incumbents in year t-1, Maturity is the average debt maturity of incumbents in year
t-1, and Cash Holdings is the average cash holdings of incumbents in year t-1. All regressions include
an intercept (not reported). t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance
at the 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.
Dependent variable: Price Cut
(1) (2) (3)






Observations 392 392 392
R-squared 0.013 0.014 0.025
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Table 8: Are results driven by Financially Constrained Airlines?
The dependent variables in the regressions are Book Leverage and Debt Maturity. Airlines are divided
between financially constrained (book assets below annual median, or SA Index above annual median)
and financially unconstrained (book assets above year median, or SA Index below annual median). SA
Index is defined as in Hadlock and Pierce (2010). Threat o f Entry measures the percentage of routes
under the threat of entry by low cost carriers weighted by the number of passengers. Log Sales is the
log of dollar sales. Pro f itability is operative income before depreciation over book assets. Tangibility
is Property, Plat and Equipment over book assets. Asset Maturity is current assets over current as-
sets plus Property, Plat and Equipment times current assets over cost of goods sold, plus Property,
Plat and Equipment over current assets plus Property, Plat and Equipment times Property, Plat and
Equipment over depreciation and amortization. Paying Passengers is log passengers. Accounting vari-
ables are winsorized at the 1% level. All regressions include an intercept (not reported) and year and
airline dummies where specified. Errors are clustered at the airline level. t-statistics are reported in
parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.
Proxy of financial constraints Size SA
Dependent Variable: Lev Mat Lev Mat
Financially Constrained Y N Y N Y N Y N
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Threat of Entry -0.0596 0.1402 0.3501** 0.0754 -0.1497 0.0833 0.3317** 0.0868
(-0.34) (1.16) (2.26) (0.56) (-0.80) (1.20) (2.13) (1.03)
Log Sales 0.0329 -0.0217 0.0600 0.1069 -0.0352 0.0314 0.1308 0.1207**
(0.28) (-0.36) (0.79) (1.20) (-0.28) (1.03) (1.54) (2.72)
Profitability 0.2797 0.3502 0.0467 -0.1862 0.3175 0.4096 0.0857 -0.2789
(1.27) (0.66) (0.21) (-0.41) (1.18) (0.89) (0.38) (-1.03)
Tangibility 1.0185*** 0.0024 1.0549** -0.8478* 0.9026*** -0.5633 0.8081 -1.5842***
(5.23) (0.01) (2.25) (-1.87) (3.64) (-1.10) (1.55) (-3.25)
Asset Maturity -0.0045 0.0035 -0.0202 0.0069 -0.0031 0.0092 -0.0087 0.0166**
(-0.79) (0.38) (-1.60) (0.88) (-0.52) (1.43) (-0.67) (2.72)
Paying Passengers 0.0458 0.0793 0.0010 0.0384 0.0808 -0.0285 -0.0045 0.0148
(1.26) (0.96) (0.02) (0.69) (1.65) (-0.28) (-0.07) (0.20)
Airline Fixed E↵ects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Time Fixed E↵ects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 117 117 89 114 114 115 87 111
R-squared 0.704 0.619 0.806 0.514 0.734 0.714 0.806 0.650
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Table 9: Does the Threat of Entry a↵ect Debt Composition?
The dependent variables in the regressions are the proportion of bank debt, secured debt, and capital
leasing, respectively. Threat o f Entry measures the percentage of routes under the threat of entry by
low cost carriers weighted by the number of passengers. Log Sales is the log of dollar sales. Pro f itability
is operative income before depreciation over book assets. Tangibility is Property, Plat and Equipment
over book assets. Asset Maturity is current assets over current assets plus Property, Plat and Equipment
times current assets over cost of goods sold, plus Property, Plat and Equipment over current assets plus
Property, Plat and Equipment times Property, Plat and Equipment over depreciation and amortization.
Paying Passengers is log passengers. Accounting variables are winsorized at the 1% level. All regressions
include an intercept (not reported) and year and airline dummies where specified. Errors are clustered
at the airline level. t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at the
10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.
Dependent variable: Bank Debt Secured Debt Capital Leasing
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Threat of Entry -0.2938** -0.2072* 0.1527 0.2004 -0.1326 -0.1333
(-2.22) (-1.94) (1.09) (1.44) (-1.33) (-1.51)
Sales -0.0538 0.0098 0.0184 0.0653 -0.0084 0.0354
(-0.97) (0.17) (0.29) (1.03) (-0.09) (0.68)
Profitability 0.1277 -0.0457 -1.0656*** -1.1518*** -0.2649 -0.2888
(0.58) (-0.21) (-3.85) (-4.32) (-1.41) (-1.76)
Tangibility -0.7574*** -0.6052** -0.3949* -0.2928 -0.2416*** -0.1831**
(-3.04) (-2.43) (-1.75) (-1.50) (-3.87) (-2.49)
Asset Maturity 0.0085* 0.0030 0.0180** 0.0138** 0.0053 0.0047
(1.99) (0.62) (2.79) (2.40) (0.95) (1.22)
Paying Passengers -0.1018* -0.0780** -0.1046
(-1.77) (-2.64) (-1.51)
Airline Fixed E↵ects Y Y Y Y Y Y
Time Fixed E↵ects Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 141 141 174 174 110 110
R-squared 0.876 0.888 0.744 0.753 0.836 0.850
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Table 10: Full sample results
The dependent variables in the regressions are Debt Maturity computed as non-current Liabilities over
non-current Liabilities plus current Liabilities; Leverage computed as total Liabilities over total assets;
Cash Holdings computed as total cash over total assets.
Threat o f Entry measures the percentage of routes under the threat of entry by low cost carriers
weighted by the number of passengers. Size is the log of total assets. Pro f itability is net income over
book assets. Paying Passengers is log passengers. Load Factor is Load Factor*(Net Income/Passengers).
Term Spread is the di↵erence between the yield on ten-year government bonds and the yield on three-
month government bonds disclosed by the Federal Reserve. Financial data are taken from Form 41
financial filings. The sample contains 138 di↵erent airlines. Time interval indicates the year included
in the sample (e.g., 91-13 indicates that years from 1991 to 2013 are considered). Accounting variables
are winsorized at the 1% level. All regressions include an intercept (not reported) and year and
airline dummies where specified. Errors are clustered at the airline level. t-statistics are reported in
parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.
Dependent variable: Debt Maturity Leverage Cash Holdings
Time interval: 91-13 01-13 91-00 91-13 91-13 91-13
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Threat of Entry 0.2207*** 0.2067** 0.2111** 0.2063*** 0.0586 0.0571
(2.81) (2.26) (2.01) (4.44) (0.78) (1.09)
Size 0.1349*** 0.1682*** 0.1720*** 0.1380*** 0.0044 -0.0534***
(4.26) (3.05) (6.93) (4.34) (0.16) (-3.58)
Profitability 0.0013 -0.0458 0.1575 0.0053 -0.0065 0.0648
(0.02) (-1.07) (1.16) (0.10) (-0.17) (1.26)
Load Factor -0.1047 -1.8895** 0.2132 -0.3095 0.1224 -0.3142
(-0.22) (-2.07) (0.78) (-0.62) (0.45) (-0.95)
Paying Passengers -0.0326* -0.0598** -0.0408** -0.0330** -0.0011 0.0031





Airline Fixed E↵ects Y Y Y Y Y Y
Time Fixed E↵ects Y Y Y N Y Y
Observations 794 452 342 794 794 782
R-squared 0.761 0.842 0.787 0.746 0.614 0.641
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Table 11: Does Actual Entry a↵ect Debt Policies?
The dependent variables in the regressions are Book Leverage and Newly Issued Long term Debt. Entry
measures the percentage of routes where entry actually occurs. Low cost airlines are dropped. Log
Sales is the log of dollar sales. Pro f itability is operative income before depreciation over book assets.
Tangibility is Property, Plat and Equipment over book assets. Asset Maturity is current assets over
current assets plus Property, Plat and Equipment times current assets over cost of goods sold, plus
Property, Plat and Equipment over current assets plus Property, Plat and Equipment times Property,
Plat and Equipment over depreciation and amortization. Paying Passengers is log passengers. Q is
book assets plus market value of equity minus book equity over book assets. Accounting variables
are winsorized at the 1% level. All regressions include an intercept (not reported) and year and
airline dummies where specified. Errors are clustered at the airline level. t-statistics are reported in
parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.
Dependent Variable: Leverage Newly Issued Long-term debt
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Entry -0.0946 0.1122 0.2634 0.2890 0.1740
(-0.21) (0.37) (1.20) (1.22) (0.65)
Sales -0.0196 0.0959 -0.0488* -0.0662* -0.0521**
(-0.17) (1.34) (-1.78) (-1.99) (-2.24)
Profitability -0.7805 -0.9132*** 0.1456** 0.1750** 0.1474*
(-1.35) (-3.10) (2.55) (2.59) (2.14)
Tangibility 0.5658 0.7916** -0.0154 -0.0496 -0.0063
(1.27) (2.41) (-0.17) (-0.48) (-0.06)
Asset Maturity -0.0136 -0.0180** 0.0034 0.0046 0.0020
(-1.33) (-2.63) (1.13) (1.48) (0.45)
paying Passengers -0.0149 0.0135 0.0244* 0.0124





Airline Fixed E↵ects Y Y Y Y Y
Time Fixed E↵ects Y Y Y Y N
Observations 234 184 234 234 184
R-squared 0.558 0.841 0.379 0.388 0.280
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Table 12: Bootstrapped standard errors
The dependent variable in the regressions is Debt Maturity computed as non-current Long-term debt
minus long-term debt maturing in 2 and 3 years over total debt. Threat o f Entry measures the
percentage of routes under the threat of entry by low cost carriers weighted by the number of passengers.
Log Sales is the log of dollar sales. Pro f itability is operative income before depreciation over book
assets. Tangibility is Property, Plat and Equipment over book assets. Asset Maturity is current assets
over current assets plus Property, Plat and Equipment times current assets over cost of goods sold, plus
Property, Plat and Equipment over current assets plus Property, Plat and Equipment times Property,
Plat and Equipment over depreciation and amortization. Paying Passengers is log passengers. Q is
book asset plus market value of assets minus total common/ordinary equity over book assets. Term
Spread is the di↵erence between the yield on ten-year government bonds and the yield on three-month
government bonds disclosed by the Federal Reserve. Accounting variables are winsorized at the 1%
level. All regressions include an intercept (not reported) and year and airline dummies where specified.
Errors are obtained through block bootstrapping with 26 blocks and 200 replications. t-statistics are
reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.
Dependent variable: Debt Maturity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Threat of Entry 0.2813*** 0.2823*** 0.2964*** 0.2113** 0.2097** 0.3740***
(3.07) (2.65) (2.88) (2.58) (2.40) (4.08)
Log Sales 0.1050* 0.1066 0.1876* 0.0871* 0.0788 0.1120*
(1.95) (1.63) (1.65) (1.77) (1.36) (1.71)
Profitability 0.1188 0.1157 0.3482 0.0889 0.1016 0.2323
(0.31) (0.28) (0.72) (0.26) (0.29) (0.67)
Tangibility 0.0636 0.0663 0.2504 0.0436 0.0259 0.1774
(0.22) (0.15) (0.50) (0.15) (0.08) (0.65)
Asset Maturity 0.0051 0.0050 0.0005 0.0060 0.0064 0.0023
(0.67) (0.54) (0.04) (1.01) (1.04) (0.30)
Paying Passengers -0.0022 -0.0327 0.0122 -0.0304
(-0.03) (-0.46) (0.22) (-0.65)
Q -0.1016 -0.0659
(-1.63) (-1.61)
Term Spread -0.0207** -0.0206** -0.0242**
(-2.26) (-1.97) (-2.47)
Airline Fixed E↵ects Y Y Y Y Y Y
Time Fixed E↵ects Y Y Y N N N
Observations 203 203 161 203 203 161
R-squared 0.634 0.634 0.710 0.614 0.614 0.686
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Table 13: Other Variables
The dependent variables in the regressions are Cash Holdings, Investment, Asset Growth and Equity
Issuance, respectively. Threat o f Entry measures the percentage of routes under the threat of entry by
low cost carriers weighted by the number of passengers. Log Sales is the log of dollar sales. Pro f itability
is operative income before depreciation over book assets. Tangibility is Property, Plat and Equipment
over book assets. Asset Maturity is current assets over current assets plus Property, Plat and Equipment
times current assets over cost of goods sold, plus Property, Plat and Equipment over current assets plus
Property, Plat and Equipment times Property, Plat and Equipment over depreciation and amortization.
Paying Passengers is log passengers. Accounting variables are winsorized at the 1% level. All regressions
include an intercept (not reported) and year and airline dummies where specified. Errors are clustered
at the airline level. t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at the
10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.
Dependent variable: Cash Holdings Investment Asset Growth Equity Issuance
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Threat of Entry -0.0045 0.0689 0.6669 0.2810
(-0.08) (1.56) (1.71) (0.78)
Log Sales -0.0138 -0.0782*** -0.1065 -0.2228
(-0.73) (-4.37) (-0.84) (-1.36)
Profitability 0.2947*** -0.0492 3.2968 0.3391
(4.57) (-0.52) (1.67) (0.89)
Tangibility -0.2642*** -0.0338 -1.3080** -1.1402
(-2.90) (-0.37) (-2.42) (-1.57)
Asset Maturity 0.0039 0.0055 0.0669*** 0.0236
(1.37) (1.60) (3.03) (1.62)
Paying Passengers 0.0006 0.0096 0.0616 0.0765
(0.05) (0.90) (0.52) (0.97)
Airline Fixed E↵ects Y Y Y Y
Time Fixed E↵ects Y Y Y Y
Observations 234 234 228 228
R-squared 0.698 0.642 0.357 0.209
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Table 14: Does Exit a↵ect Debt Maturity?
The dependent variables in the regressions are Debt Maturity (columns 1 and 2) and Newly Issued
Long-term debt (columns 3 and 4). Exit measures the percentage of incumbent’s i routes left low cost
airlines. Log Sales is the log of dollar sales. Pro f itability is operative income before depreciation over
book assets. Tangibility is Property, Plat and Equipment over book assets. Asset Maturity is current
assets over current assets plus Property, Plat and Equipment times current assets over cost of goods
sold, plus Property, Plat and Equipment over current assets plus Property, Plat and Equipment times
Property, Plat and Equipment over depreciation and amortization. Paying Passengers is log passengers.
Q is book assets plus market value of equity minus book equity over book assets. Accounting variables
are winsorized at the 1% level. All regressions include an intercept (not reported) and year and
airline dummies where specified. Errors are clustered at the airline level. t-statistics are reported in
parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.
Dependent Variable: Debt Maturity Newly Issued Long-term debt
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Exit -0.4630 -0.4131 -0.1875 -0.0495
(-0.92) (-1.49) (-0.86) (-0.36)
Log Sales 0.0956 0.0647 -0.0443 -0.0425**
(1.49) (1.55) (-1.64) (-2.07)
Profitability 0.0637 0.0672 0.1268* 0.1022
(0.17) (0.20) (2.01) (1.59)
Tangibility 0.1113 0.0757 -0.0157 -0.0181
(0.29) (0.25) (-0.16) (-0.21)
Asset Maturity 0.0030 0.0039 0.0032 0.0028
(0.45) (0.66) (0.99) (0.85)
Term Spread -0.0122 0.0031
(-1.21) (0.69)
Airline Fixed E↵ects Y Y Y Y
Time Fixed E↵ects Y N Y N
Observations 192 192 222 222
R-squared 0.617 0.597 0.399 0.339
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A Appendix
Table A.1: Description of variables
This table provides a detailed description of the variables used. Airline characteristics are from Com-
pustat and form 41 filings. Debt structure variables are from Capital IQ. Size, equipment owned and
sales are in million dollars, passengers and employees are in thousand people.
Variable Definition
Size Total assets
Sales Log of sales
Total Debt Debt in current liabilities + Long-term debt
Threat of Entry See Section 4
Profitability Operating income before depreciation / Total assets
Tangibility Net property, plant and equipment (PPENT) / Total assets
Asset Maturity (Current Assets/(Current Assets+PPENT)*(Current Assets/Cost of goods sold)+
+(PPENT/(Current Assets+PPENT)*(PPENT/Depreciation and amortization)
Paying passengers Log passengers
Cash Holdings Cash/Total assets
Fuel Fuel expenditure for domestic flights over book assets
Rating Dummy = 1 if a firm is rated by S&P
Equipment Owned Log dollar value of equipment owned (including leased planes)
Employees Log employees
Distress Dummy = 1 if firm’s value of total liabilities is greater than total value of assets
Load Factor Load factor from 41 filings *
* (Operating income before depreciation / Passengers)
COST Cost of goods sold/Available seats
Term Spread yield on ten-year government bond -
- yield on three-month government bonds
Q (book assets + market value of equity - book equity)/ book assets
Book Leverage Total Debt/Total Assets
Market Leverage Total Debt/(Total Assets + Market Value of Equity - Book Value of Equity)
Debt Maturity Ratio of long-term debt (DLTT) -
- debt maturing in two and three years (DD2+DD3) to total debt
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Delegated portfolio management creates a principal-agent problem because the fund investor
(principal) can only imperfectly monitor the fund manager (agent), and their incentives are
not necessarily aligned1. This conflict of interest can be magnified when a fund is not a
standalone entity, but belongs to a mutual fund family. In particular, a liation with a
mutual fund family implies that a portfolio manager is first of all working for the family and
not for the fund’s investors.
In this paper we study how the tension between fund interests, family interests and
shareholder interests impacts a fund family’s performance distribution. Specifically, using a
unique institutional trade-level dataset we examine the cross-trading activity inside mutual
fund families and its consequence on performance. Cross-trades are transactions where buy
and sell orders for the same stock coming from the same fund family are o↵set by the broker
without going into the open market. Cross-trades are permitted under rule 17a-7 of the
U.S. Investment Company Act and can be beneficial for mutual fund investors since they
reduce trading costs and commissions. However, unfairly priced cross-trades are illegal and
potentially shift performance between the two parties involved in the trade.
Previous literature has provided evidence of illegal performance shifting consistent with
cross-trading. However, due to data availability previous papers infer potential cross-trading
activity from quarterly holdings data2 (see e.g. Gaspar, Massa, and Matos (2006), Goncalves-
Pinto and Sotes-Paladino (2010)) or indirectly from return level data (see Chaudhuri, Ivkovich,
and Trzcinka (2012)) with controversial findings. In contrast, from our institutional trade-
level dataset provided by Ancerno we identify cross-trades as trades executed within the
same fund family, in the same stock, with the same volume, the same execution price, the
1There is a significant literature suggesting that money manager opportunistically try to present a “rosier”
version of reality to their investors, see, e.g., Lakonishok, Shleifer, Thaler, and Vishny (1991), Sias and Starks
(1997), Ben-David, Franzoni, Landier, and Moussawi (2013) on window dressing practices.
2Using quarterly holdings it is not possible to distinguish whether two funds trading the same stock in
opposite directions are trading during the same day or in di↵erent months. Hence, the resulting proxies of
cross-trading activity are upward biased.
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same execution date and the same execution time but in opposite trade directions. Thus, we
provide a significantly more precise proxy for cross-trading activity. Additionally, having the
cross trades’ execution prices we can directly assess any impact on performance.
We begin our empirical analysis studying the determinants of cross-trading activity and
find supporting evidence for the hypothesis that cross-trading is used to shift performance
across di↵erent funds. First, cross-trading activity is significantly higher in fund families with
weak governance. Second, in line with the argument that a big di↵erence in product sizes
would allow to move performance from big to small products at low cost (Chaudhuri, Ivkovich,
and Trzcinka (2012)) we find that cross-trading activity increases when there are large size
di↵erences between funds in the family. Third, consistent with the incentive of creating “star
funds” stressed in Nanda, Wang, and Zheng (2004) cross-trading activity is increasing in
the intra-family dispersion of returns. Besides testing the cross-sectional determinants of
cross-trading activity we also study the time-series determinants. At the beginning of 2004,
the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) made several amendments to industry
regulations, as a response to the “late trading scandal”. Among the new requirements, fund
families were asked to employ a compliance o cer and to enforce compliance policies. We
hypothesize that the presence of a compliance o cer dampened any unlawful behavior inside
fund families. Hence, if cross-trading was primarily used to illegally shift performance across
funds, it should decrease after 2004. Our results suggest that indeed cross-trading activity
decreased significantly after 2004.
Families are only able to shift performance via cross-trades when the execution prices
of the trades deviate significantly from the market price at the time of order execution. In
the next step we therefore compare execution prices of cross-trades to the volume weighted
average execution price of the day (VWAP). We find that cross-trades in our sample are
often mispriced, displaying execution prices up to 2% away from VWAP. Furthermore, the
families that cross-trade the most are also more likely to cross-trade at prices far away from
the VWAP. Finally, the requirement to employ a compliance o cer pushed the execution
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prices of cross-trades significantly towards the VWAP implying a lesser degree of performance
redistribution across funds.
Our aforementioned results are suggestive of performance shifting at the mutual fund
family level. However, our findings about the mispricing of cross-trades are consistent with
two di↵erent strategies. First, in line with Goncalves-Pinto and Sotes-Paladino (2010), Bhat-
tacharya, Lee, and Pool (2012), Schmidt and Goncalves-Pinto (2012) families can shift per-
formance via cross-trades in order to smooth performance across di↵erent funds in the family.
Such a strategy would help low value funds that su↵er because of investor redemptions at
the expense of high value siblings3. We refer to such a strategy as performance smoothing.
Second, in line with the incentive of fund families to enhance the performance of the most
valuable funds (see Guedj and Papastaikoudi (2005), Gaspar, Massa, and Matos (2006), and
Evans (2010)) fund families can use cross-trades to play favorites, increasing the performance
of high value funds while hurting the performance of the less valuable funds.
To distinguish between the two di↵erent strategies we study mutual fund returns em-
ploying an empirical strategy motivated by the seminal paper of Gaspar, Massa, and Matos
(2006). In particular, we study the di↵erences in risk-adjusted returns between funds hav-
ing a high value for the fund family and funds having a low value for the fund family and
test whether the amount of cross-trading activity has a significant impact on this di↵erence.
Following the literature (see, e.g., Bhattacharya, Lee, and Pool (2012)) we define high-value
funds as funds with flows in the top tercile of the fund family flow distribution and low value
funds as funds with flows in the bottom tercile. We regress their spread in performance on the
percentage of cross-trading within their family conditional of being in the same investment
style and controlling for di↵erences in fund size, past performance and past flows plus other
family level controls. We find that an increase by one standard deviation in within family
cross-trading increases the gap in the alphas between high value and low value funds by 22
3We refer to “high value” (“low value”) siblings to indicate funds that we conjecture to be particularly
important (unimportant) for the family, e.g., because they are able to attract high (low) flows or charge high
(low) fees.
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basis points per month (51 bps if we consider the spread in raw returns). Additionally, we
use mutual fund fees as a sorting variable instead of flows (consistent with Gaspar, Massa,
and Matos (2006)) and find similar results. Finally, we replace the level of cross-trading with
the monthly average mispricing of cross-trades in the family as our independent variable of
interest and obtain results in line with our previous tests.
Our analysis is motivated by a recent legal action of the Security and Exchange Com-
mission against Western Asset Management. The investment firm allegedly executed the sell
side of cross transactions at the highest current independent bid price available for the secu-
rities. By cross trading securities at the bid, rather than at an average between the bid and
the ask, Western favored the buyers in the transactions over the sellers, even though both
were advisory clients of Western and owed the same fiduciary duty. As a result, Western
deprived its selling clients of approximately $6.2 million. According to the SEC Western’s
cross-trading violations were caused in large part by its failure to adopt adequate policies
and procedures to prevent unlawful cross-trading4.
Hence, to make sure our results are really driven by opportunistic practices, we explore
how time-series and cross-sectional di↵erences in family governance a↵ect our results. We find
performance shifting to be almost 10 times less e↵ective after 2003 when the new SEC reg-
ulation was implemented. Furthermore, performance shifting via cross-trades is significantly
stronger in fund families with weak family governance.
Overall, our results indicate that fund families exploit cross-trades to improve the per-
formance of high value funds at the expenses of low value siblings. This finding is consistent
with the incentive of families to improve the performance of the best funds in order to attract
new inflows. According to Chevalier and Ellison (1997), the shape of the flow-performance
relationship serves as an implicit incentive contract for mutual funds. Mutual funds earn
their fees based on their assets under management and this creates incentives for them to
attract new assets to manage. In the same vein mutual fund complexes desire to attract flows
4See administrative proceeding No. 3-15688 of January 27, 2014. Similar evidence is provided by the SEC
case against BNY Mellon, administrative proceeding No. 3-14191 of January 14, 2011.
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to the family to collect more fees. Increasing returns of sibling funds at the expense of a less
expensive fund is optimal if we take into account the findings of Sirri and Tufano (1997)
showing that an improvement in the return of a good fund disproportionally attracts new
inflows, while on the contrary, the outflows of the worst performing funds are less a↵ected by
a further drop in performance.
The incentive for fund families to play favorite is stressed in Gaspar, Massa, and Matos
(2006). The authors empirically document that favorite funds (e.g., high-fee funds) outper-
form less valuable funds. While Nanda, Wang, and Zheng (2004) show empirically that one
fund in the family outperforming the rest of the market has a significant positive impact
in terms of fund flows on all other funds in the family. Thus, strategically shifting perfor-
mance to create one “star” fund in the family can be rational from family perspective despite
simultaneously decreasing the returns for some fund investors.
This paper makes two contributions to the literature. First, a large debate in this field
concerns whether siblings help or exploit funds in the same families that su↵er because of
money redemptions. Cross-trading is probably the easiest way for equity funds to shift
performance from or to other siblings. However, mutual funds are required to publish their
holdings at a quarterly frequency. Hence, previous literature was forced to estimate imprecise
proxies of cross-trading activity out of low-frequency data. As a consequence, other papers
find controversial results. In this paper we exploit high-frequency transaction data to build a
reliable proxy of cross-trading activity. Our finding supports the hypothesis that performance
is shifted from low value funds to the most valuable siblings in the family despite fiduciary
duties would demand to treat all funds equally.
Second, we show that cross-trading has an enormous impact on the ability of funds to
generate “alpha”. We find that cross-trading boosts on average the risk-adjusted performance
of top funds of roughly 1.0% per year (causing an equivalent loss for the least important funds)
compared to funds belonging to families that display no cross-trading activity. Additionally,
this artificially constructed performance is “pure alpha” since it is uncorrelated to any risky
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factors. The mutual fund literature (as well as mutual fund clients) heavily relies on past
alpha as a proxy of a fund manager’s skill. However, our results suggest that a large fraction
of alpha has nothing to do with skill but is simply an e↵ect of performance redistribution.
Consistently, the constraint to cross-trading activity that has followed the new regulation
introduced after the late trading scandal may contribute to explain the decreased “ability”
of fund managers to generate risk-adjusted performance documented in the last decade (see,
e.g., Pastor, Stambaugh, and Taylor (2014)).
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the data we used. In Section 3 we
document cross-trading activity. Section 4 disentangles between the cooperation and the
favoritism hypotheses. Section 5 presents additional robustness checks. Section 6 concludes.
2 Data
For our analysis we compile data from four di↵erent sources. First, we use the CRSP Survivor
Bias Free US Mutual Fund Database to obtain mutual fund returns and characteristics.
Second, we use the MFLinks table provided by WRDS. Third, we use a table provided by
WRDS linking management companies from SEC 13F filings to mutual funds reporting their
holdings in the Thomson Reuter’s S12 holdings database. Finally, we use institutional trade-
level data provided by Abel Noser Solutions/ANcerno, a consulting firm that works with
institutional investors to monitor their trading costs.
2.1 Mutual Fund Data
Our dataset construction starts with a merge between the CRSP database, the MFLinks
table and information concerning the management companies. The merge with the MFLinks
table allows us to aggregate mutual fund information across di↵erent share classes and deletes
all funds not trading in equities. Furthermore, it provides an identifier to match management
companies to the mutual funds. After the merging of the datasets we impose two filters. As
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the focus of our analysis is on mutual fund families we exclude families with less than three
family members. The requirement to have at least three funds trading in equities is driven
by our empirical methodology and is explained later. Additionally, we impose a minimum
number of return observations for a fund to be included in our sample. In our empirical
analysis our dependent variables are raw returns as well as risk-adjusted returns. For the
risk adjustment we have to run time-series regressions at the fund level to compute Carhart
(1997) four factor alphas. To ensure reliable estimates we require a fund to have at least a
3-year return history. Finally, we focus on data between 1999 and 2010 where the ANcerno
data is available to us.
Besides mutual fund alphas, we obtain several other variables important for our analysis
from the CRSP Mutual Fund Database and the Thomson holdings data. On the fund level
we obtain a mutual fund’s size, its fees and its flows. Following Gaspar, Massa, and Matos
(2006) we compute fees as 1/7(frontload+rearload)+expense ratio. For the flows we follow





where TNA are the total net assets under management and ret is the monthly return
of fund i in month t. On the family level we obtain the family size, the intra-family return
dispersion and the intra-family size dispersion. Family size is the defined as the sum of the
individual funds’ assets. For intra-family return dispersion we follow Nanda, Wang, and
Zheng (2004) and compute it as







(ait  a¯ f t),
where ait is the four-factor alpha of fund i in month t and a¯ f t is the mean of four-factor
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adjusted returns of all siblings within family f in month t. The variable Size Dispersion is
defined as the di↵erence between the size of the largest and the smallest fund in the family
scaled by the average size of the funds in the family. Additionally, we compute the variable
Siblings as the natural log of the number of equity funds belonging to the same family f
in month t. Finally, we use Thompson Reuters investment objective codes to identify the
investment style for each fund.
2.2 Institutional Trading Data
We obtain trade-level data from Abel Noser Solutions/ANcerno, a consulting firm that works
with institutional investors to monitor their trading costs. This database contains a detailed
record of all executed trades since the client started reporting5. Previous research has shown
that ANcerno institutional clients constitute approximately 8% of the total CRSP daily dollar
volume (Anand, Irvine, Puckett, and Venkataraman (2012)) and that there is no survivorship
or backfill bias (see, e.g, Puckett and Yan (2011)).
The data is collected at the trade level and contains several variables useful for our
investigation: stock identifier (cusip), tradedate, execution price, execution time, volume
traded, side of the trade (i.e., buy or sell). This information is sent to Ancerno by its di↵erent
clients. The identity of the clients is thereby always anonymized. Importantly, while the client
is anonymized the family (called manager in Ancerno) is not. Ancerno for a limited period
of time has provided a separate table including a managercode and a managername and the
variables to link them to the trades. This allows us to match the Ancerno data with the
CRSP Mutual Fund Database.
In particular, we hand-match fund families from ANcerno to 13f/S12 by name. There are
few papers which use the management company identifier provided by ANcerno to match it
with 13f companies, e.g., Franzoni and Plazzi (2012), Jame (2012). However, previous papers
focused only on Hedge Funds while this is the first paper to match ANcerno to mutual fund
5Examples of other empirical studies using ANcerno include Chemmanur, He, and Hu (2009), Anand,
Irvine, Puckett, and Venkataraman (2012).
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families reporting to 13f.
Our matched database spans the time interval from 1999 to 2010 and covers families
including 35% to 45% of the funds in the CRSP database. Unfortunately, ANcerno did not
provide us with unique fund identifies. Whether it is possible to identify funds at all using
ANcerno data is debatable (from our conversations with the ANcerno support team it seems
that this is not possible). Therefore, we keep all the variables we obtain from ANcerno at
the family level. Recently, ANcerno has decided not to provide family identifiers anymore.
Hence, our data series stops at the end of 2010, since we are not able to match trades with
fund families after that date.
Our main variable of interest computed from the ANcerno data is the amount of cross-
trading taking place inside a mutual fund family. A cross-trade is a transaction where a buy
and a sell order for the same stock coming from the same fund family is conducted by the
broker without going through the open market. We identify cross-trades in our database
as transactions occurring i) in the same family ii) in the same stock, iii) at the same time,
iv) at the same price and having the v) the same volume in opposite directions. Figure 1
plots average commission costs for all the trades in ANcerno and the trades we identify as
cross-trades. The commissions paid for cross-trades are about 1/10th of the other trades
since the broker has not to look into the open market for an opposite trade but simply to
record it. This result suggests that our methodology is correct. This identification solves
the main concern about the cross-trade definition used in other papers based on quarterly
snapshots (see e.g. Gaspar, Massa, and Matos (2006)). Using our approach, opposite trades
recorded in the same quarter but occurring on di↵erent days are not considered as cross-
trades. Therefore, our main explanatory variable CTi,t is computed as the dollar volume of
cross-trades executed by family f in month t over its total dollar volume of trades in the
same month.
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2.3 Summary Statistics and Additional Variable Definitions
Table 1 presents summary statistics over time. Panel A shows the sample of mutual funds
before matching the families with Ancerno data. The average number of funds per month
ranges from a maximum of 1799 to a minimum of 775. These funds are managed by between
225 and 135 di↵erent mutual fund management companies. The average and median mutual
fund size significantly increases over time. While the average fund size was around USD 1
billion in 1999 it increased to nearly USD 1.9 billion in 2010.
Matching our sample of mutual funds to the ANcerno data decreases our sample size
significantly. On average our matched sample contains between 20% and 25% of the mutual
fund families from Panel A. Having between 36 and 49 families and 357 and 709 di↵erent mu-
tual funds provides however a sample su cient to conduct our empirical tests. Importantly,
our sample is biased toward large families since the smallest families are less likely to buy
ANcerno’s services (this bias has been recognized also by previous studies see, e.g, Puckett
and Yan (2011)). In particular, our final sample contains observations from 8 out of the 10
largest mutual fund families is the United States6. However, since the top 10 families hold
around 70% of the assets managed by the whole mutual fund industry, the bias toward larger
institutions does not seem to compromise the validity of our analysis.
Table 2 presents summary statistics for the variables used in our empirical tests. Panel
A shows fund level variables and Panel B displays family level variables. in total we match
206 families out of which 127 cross-trade at least one time. The most important variable
for our analysis is the cross-trading variable CT . In total we classify 732434 separate trades
as cross-trades The average monthly cross-trading volume per family is 0.0135% of the total
monthly trading volume. This number is small, but mainly driven by the fact that a large
fraction of families are not engaging in any cross-trade activity. For more than 75% of all
our family-month observation the variable CT is equal to zero.
Panel B of Table 2 also contains the so far undefined variable Weak Governance. In
6Given the non-disclosure agreement we signed with ANcerno we are forbidden to reveal the exact names
of the management companies contained in our sample.
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several of our tests we study the relationship between cross-trading and the governance of
the mutual fund family. For this purpose we search in the Internet and in the SEC filings
whether a family was involved in any kind of SEC litigation. Panel B of Table 2 shows that
36.8 of all our observations comes from families involved in a SEC investigation.
3 Empirical Results
3.1 The cross-section of cross-trades
Cross-trading is the practice where buy and sell orders for the same stock coming from the
same fund family are o↵set by the broker without going through the open market. Cross-
trades are permitted under rule 17a-7 of the U.S. Investment Company Act provided that
i) such transactions involve securities for which market quotations are readily available, ii)
transactions are e↵ected at the independent current market prices of the securities, and iii)
the “current market price” for certain securities7 is calculated by averaging the highest and
lowest current independent bid and o↵er price determined on the basis of a reasonable inquiry.
Yet, some discretion may be in order when determining the “current market price8”.
This section studies how family characteristics and time-series variation in mutual fund
industry regulations a↵ect cross-trading activity. In particular, if cross-trades are used to
shift performance, we would expect the following variables to be correlated with a family’s
cross-trading activity.
Previous literature suggests that fund proliferation is used as a marketing strategy to
attract new clients (Massa (2003)) and a large number of funds in a family allows families
to manage their funds like internal capital markets shifting performance across funds with
similar holdings and investment styles. The first explanatory variable used in our analysis is
7E.g., municipal securities.
8From our talks with compliance o cers and professionals in large fund families, we understand that
the pricing of cross- trades is considered one of the most relevant and critical compliance issues. Yet these
trades are usually checked only with a delay and a cross-trade is considered “suspicious” only if the recorded
execution price strongly deviates from the average between the bid and the ask.
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therefore the number of funds in a family (Siblings). We also include a mutual fund family’s
size in our regressions (Family Size). The high correlation of Family Size and Siblings (above
90%) potentially creates problems due to multicollinearity concerns.
The next variable we use is Weak Governance, a dummy equal to 1 for families involved
in a SEC litigation case and equal to zero otherwise. We conjecture that families having been
engaged in suspicious practices in the past are on average more likely to lack the necessary
control mechanisms to detect and avoid illegal cross-trading activity.
Chaudhuri, Ivkovich, and Trzcinka (2012) argue that an asymmetry of “product” size
allows to take away relatively minor performance from larger funds to enhance substantially
the performance of smaller funds. In line with this argument we include the variable Size
Dispersion in our regressions.
Nanda, Wang, and Zheng (2004) empirically show that a strategy of some mutual fund
families is to start a large number of funds with di↵erent strategies to increase the chances to
create a “star fund”, i.e., a fund whose performance ranks high among its peers. Such families
have on average a higher intra-family return dispersion (Return Dispersion). We conjecture
that families following the aforementioned strategy are also more likely to use cross-trades in
order to increase the performance of specific funds in the family.
Finally, we study governance not only in the cross-section, but also in the time-series. An
exogenous change in the regulatory environment forcing management companies to improve
their governance was triggered by the late trading scandal. On September 3, 2003 the New
York State Attorney General Eliot Spitzer announced the issuance of a complaint claiming
that several mutual fund firms had arrangements allowing trades that violated terms in their
funds’ prospectuses, fiduciary duties, and securities laws. Subsequent investigations showed
that at least twenty mutual fund management companies, including some of the industry’s
largest firms, had struck deals permitting improper trading (McCabe (2009)).
As a consequence of the scandal, in 2004 the SEC adopted new rules requiring fund
families to adopt more stringent compliance policies. In particular, Rule 38a-1 under the
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Investment Company Act of 1940 required each fund to appoint a chief compliance o cer
responsible for administering the fund’s policies and procedures. Additionally, compliance
o cers have to report directly to the board of directors to increase their independence. The
compliance date of the new rules and rule amendments was October 5, 2004. From our talks
with compliance o cers at one of the largest management companies, we understood that
one of the main tasks of the compliance o cer is to check that the execution price of the
cross-trades is within a “reasonable” range from the mid price of the day.
This regulatory change makes it, on the one hand, more di cult for fund families to
misprice cross-trades. On the other hand, if performance shifting was the main rationale for
crossing trades within the family, the new regulation reduces the incentive for cross-trading
activity. To capture a potential decrease in cross-trading activity we define a dummy variable
equal to one for observations after 2003
Table 3 presents results from pooled regressions of cross-trading activity on the above-
mentioned variables. Observations are at the month-family level and all standard errors are
clustered at the time level. In columns (1)-(6) of Table 3 we first run univariate regressions
using the di↵erent family characteristics and, to capture the regulatory change in 2004, the
dummy equal to one for observations after 2003. Our results indicate that families with
many siblings, weak governance, high size and return dispersion, and a large family size have
exhibit significantly higher cross-trading activity. This result is in line with the hypothesis
that mutual fund families use cross-trades to actively shift performance between di↵erent
funds in the family. Additionally, the average amount of cross-trading significantly drops (by
roughly 8.4 basis points) after the late trading scandal. Hence, the new compliance policy
was e↵ective at the very least in limiting the amount of cross-trading activity.
In column 7 we run multivariate regressions. While most of the coe cients stay signif-
icant and have similar magnitudes as in the univariate regressions, the e↵ect of Siblings on
the amount of cross-trading becomes ambiguous. The estimated coe cient is positive and
significant in column 1. After controlling for other family characteristics however, the sign
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changes in column 7. This finding is probably driven by the high correlation between Siblings
and FamilySize.
In Figure 2 we plot the average amount of cross-trading across time. The figure shows
clearly that the decrease in cross-trading is not a trend but starts around the late trading
scandal. In particular, cross-trading activity drops significantly after the new regulation’s
compliance date.
3.2 The Pricing of Cross-Trades
Cross-trading is legal when it occurs at reasonable market prices and does not benefit one
counterparty over the other. Conversely, cross-trading shifts performance when one party
buys (or sells) at a discount (or at a premium). In Table 4 we regress the absolute percentage
deviation of the execution price from the VWAP on family characteristics. If cross-trades were
correctly priced we should not observe significant deviations from the VWAP. Additionally,
family characteristics should not matter on how cross-trades are priced. Here only one leg of
the cross-trades is included in the sample, e.g., only the buy side (since the sell side of the
cross-trades is executed at the same price, running our regressions only on the sell side would
give exactly the same results). In our regressions we use the same explanatory variables as
before. We do not include stock level controls since characteristics that normally have an
e↵ect on the execution price (such as stock illiquidity, price impact, past return) should be of
no importance when the trade is not executed in the open market. Our regressions are now
at the trade level and include only cross-trades. Day fixed e↵ects are included and errors are
clustered at the day level.
Almost all variables that predict a larger amount of cross-trading activity also predict
higher mispricing in the execution price. Families with weak governance, more assets to
manage, and large fund size dispersion execute cross-trades at prices far away from the
average of the market during the day for that particular stock (the coe cient of Return
Dispersion is however not significantly di↵erent from zero). This result strongly suggests
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that cross-trades executed within such families “move” performance. Additionally, after the
late trading scandal, the average deviation from the VWAP drops by 36 basis points (see
also Figure 3). Results in this section suggest that cross-trading shifts performance between
funds. However, we cannot tell whether cross-trades are use to shift performance to the most
valuable funds or smooth performance across all funds in the family.
4 Star funds, cross-trading and performance shifting
4.1 Methodology
In this section we explore whether fund families use mispriced cross trades as a tool for shifting
performance toward the most valuable funds or smooth performance across the family.
On the one hand, the work of Nanda, Wang, and Zheng (2004) suggests that there is a
clear incentive for a mutual fund family to improve the performance of good performing funds
with high inflows. Nanda, Wang, and Zheng (2004) find that funds rated as “star” funds by
the popular Morningstar rating experience significant inflows and they have a positive spill-
over e↵ect on other funds in the family. Specifically, also other funds in the family have higher
inflows when there is one“star” fund in the family. On the contrary, a bad performing fund in
the family does not seem to have any negative e↵ect on the flows to rest of the family. Flows
are of particular importance in the mutual fund industry since revenues are usually a fixed
part of the asset under management, i.e., performance fees are uncommon (Haslem (2010)).
Hence, in order to maximize fees at the family level performance shifting via cross-trades can
be an optimal strategy for a fund family.
On the other hand, cross-trades can be used by the family to provide liquidity to under-
performing funds to decrease the performance consequences of large investor redemptions.
This strategy would be optimal when a severe underperformance of a fund has a negative
impact on the other members of the family that is greater than the cost of providing coinsur-
ance. Goncalves-Pinto and Sotes-Paladino (2010), Bhattacharya, Lee, and Pool (2012) and
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Schmidt and Goncalves-Pinto (2012) provide support for this hypothesis.
The two alternative hypotheses mentioned above have opposite empirical predictions. Ac-
cording to the favoritism hypothesis, cross-trading should increase the gap in the performance
between the most important funds and the least important funds in the family. Conversely,
the performance smoothing hypothesis predicts that cross-trading reduces the spread in their
performance. Importantly, according to the law cross-trading could decrease trading costs
and, hence, improve funds’ performance. However, it should not be systematically correlated
with the gap in the performance between high and low value funds.
It is important to highlight again that due to the structure of our data we are not able
to identify the funds on both sides of a cross-trade, i.e. we are not able to pinpoint which
funds in the family are trading with each other. Our empirical strategy is therefore first to
define groups of funds inside a family which we hypothesize are likely to benefit or su↵er
from cross-trading if a fund family strategically shifts performance. Afterwards, we test
whether the di↵erence in their returns correlates with cross-trading activity drawing from
the methodology of Gaspar, Massa, and Matos (2006).
Specifically, in our main tests we rank funds according to their monthly flows (see, e.g.,
Bhattacharya, Lee, and Pool (2012)). The reason for ranking funds according to their flows
is intuitive. Funds with outflows are liquidity demanders and funds with inflows are the
natural liquidity suppliers. On the one hand, under a performance smoothing family strategy
the liquidity suppliers can buy at inflated prices securities from the liquidity demanding
funds thereby increasing the performance of the outflow funds while decreasing their own
performance. On the other hand, the liquidity supplying funds can buy at deflated prices
securities from the liquidity demanding funds increasing the performance of the inflow funds.
Besides ranking funds according to their flows, in some of our tests we also rank funds
according to their fees following Gaspar, Massa, and Matos (2006).
Having ranked the funds, we sort them inside a family into terciles9. Funds that display
9Using quintiles gives similar results.
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intermediate flows are discarded. From the two extreme terciles we construct pairwise com-
binations of funds from the top and the bottom terciles and we compute the spread in their
style adjusted performance (4-factor alpha). In order to control for style e↵ects we impose
as an additional restriction that the funds operate in the same investment style.
For instance, consider a family having 6 funds with the same investment style and assume
that in month t, the funds have all di↵erent flows. This implies a ranking from 1 to 6 and
two funds in each tercile. For our analysis we discard the funds ranked third and fourth and
we build the return spread from the remaining funds. Specifically, the observations in our
final sample are the di↵erence of performance between fund 5 and fund 1; fund 5 and fund
2; fund 6 and fund; fund 6 and fund 2.
To understand whether cross-trading smoothes performance across the family or shifts
performance to the most valuable funds, we regress the spread in performance between funds
in the top tercile and bottom tercile on di↵erent measures of cross-trading activity controlling
for family characteristics and observable di↵erences between the two funds. Formally,
Spreadi, j,t = b(CTf ,t)+Controlsi, j,t +qt + ei, j,t ,
where spread is the di↵erence between the high value fund i and the low value fund j’s
raw performance (or 4 factor alpha) in month t conditional on having the same investment
style and belonging to the same fund family. qt are month fixed e↵ects and CTf ,t is the
cross-trading measure.
The average spread will be positive since on average funds with higher flows (fees) out-
perform funds with lower flows (fees). However, under the null hypothesis of no strategic
interaction, we should not expect a statistically significant correlation between the spread in
performance and CT . Under the favoritism hypothesis we should expect a positive correlation
between the spread and CT (i.e., favoritism increases the performance of the high value funds
at the expense of the low value siblings). Under the performance smoothing hypothesis we
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should expect a negative coe cient (i.e., families smooth performance, decreasing the gap in
performance between high and low value funds).
4.2 Favoritism versus Performance Smoothing
In Table 5 we study the e↵ect of cross-trading activity on the performance spread between
high flow and low flow funds inside each family. We report results for the spread in style
adjusted returns (columns 1-4) and for the spread in 4-factor alphas (columns 5-8). All of
our regressions include time fixed e↵ects and we cluster errors at the time level10.
The correlation between CT and spread is positive and strongly significant. This result
suggests that cross-trades favor the high inflow funds at the expenses of low inflow funds inside
the family and does not support the performance smoothing hypothesis. Controlling for a
number of control variable does change the results qualitatively. In column 2 and 6 we include
Family Size in the regressions to control for the significant relation between cross-trading and
family size11. In columns 3 and 7 we include a number of fund level controls. Specifically, to
ensure that our results are not driven by di↵erences in characteristics between the two funds
in a spread portfolio we include their size di↵erence (DSize), their return di↵erence in the
previous month (DReturns) and the their flow di↵erence in the previous month (DFLow). The
results suggest that fund level di↵erences are of no statistical importance. Finally, we also
include the family level variables Size Dispersion and Return Dispersion in the regressions.
Columns 4 and 8 suggest that Size Dispersion and Return Dispersion not only have a positive
impact on cross-trading activity, but also independently predict a higher di↵erence in returns
between high value funds and low value funds.
We consider di↵erent specifications of our main test. First, instead of using the cross-
trading activity CT as a regressor we use the value-weighted mispricing of cross-trades. Po-
tentially, our previous results would be consistent also with a big spread in performance
10Clustering errors at the fund pair level or including fund-pair fixed e↵ects does not influence the results.
11We use family size and not the number of siblings. Using Siblings as a regressor does not change the
results.
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between high and low value siblings triggering higher cross-trading activity. In order to show
that cross-trades have a causal e↵ect on the performance spread, we want to show that a
higher mispricing of the cross-trades is associated with a larger performance gap. To obtain
this explanatory variable we first compute the mispricing of each cross-trade as the di↵erence
between the execution price and the VWAP of the day. Afterwards we aggregate the mis-
pricings for each family in each month by weighting the di↵erent cross-trades by their dollar
size. Hence, a family whose cross-trades are on average priced far away from the VWAP have
a higher value of our variable “value-weighted mispricing”. The results in Table 6 suggest
a positive e↵ect of value-weighted mispricing on the performance spread between high flow
funds and low flow funds. Again, this results supports the hypothesis of a family strategy
which shifts performance to the most valuable funds.
Second, we sort funds according to their fees instead of their flows. Gaspar, Massa, and
Matos (2006) argue that high fee funds are more valuable to the family as they generate
more fee income. Hence, families can use cross-trades to increase the performance and the
subsequent flows of high fee funds. And indeed, the results in Table 7 support this hypothesis.
Although the results are economically weaker, there is a statistically significant relationship
between the amount of cross-trading inside the family and the performance spread between
high fee funds and low fee funds inside a mutual fund family.
Overall, our empirical results are consistent with the hypothesis that mutual fund families
use cross-trades to shift performance to their most valuable funds. In families where cross-
trading activity is high, the spread in performance between popular and unpopular funds is
greater.
In the next section we study whether the performance implications of cross-trading vary
systemically with proxies for fund governance in the time-series and cross-section.
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4.3 Governance
Drawing from our analysis in Section 3 we study in this section the impact of di↵erences in
mutual fund governance on the performance spread between high value funds and low value
funds. We start by analysing the impact of the regulatory change due to the mutual fund
late trading scandal.
In Table 8 we therefore divide the sample into a pre-2003 period and a post-2003 period
and run our analysis separately on the two di↵erent samples. The results in Table 8 show
that the coe cients for the e↵ect of CT on the spread of the performance between high
and low value funds are 10 times smaller after the late trading scandal and not statistically
significant. Figures 2 and 3 show that the amount of cross-trading as well as the mispricing of
cross-trades dropped significantly after the scandal (i.e., it is not just a trend). Interestingly,
the mispricing of the cross-trades increases again around the financial crisis. This finding
suggests that the value of shifting performance to “rescue” the important funds in the family
during the crisis was higher than the cost of “being caught”.
In particular, concerning the anecdotal evidence reported in the introduction about the
legal action of the Security and Exchange Commission against Western Asset Management,
the SEC discovered that most of the (allegedly) illegal cross-trading activity took place during
the financial crisis. This seems consistent with our findings.
In Table 9 instead of analysing the relation between mutual fund governance changes
in the time-series and the performance spread, we examine cross-sectional di↵erences in
governance using our previously defined variable Weak Governance. Columns 1 to 4 show
results for the sample of mutual funds where the value of Weak Governance is equal to 1,
whereas columns 5 to 8 show results for the sample of mutual funds where the value of Weak
Governance is equal to 0. Consistent with the hypothesis that predation is stronger in fami-
lies where governance is weak, we find our results to be entirely driven by sample of mutual
funds with weak governance.
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5 Robustness
In this section we provide additional evidence supporting the validity of our results. A
potential issue with our results in Table 5 is that, given that the distribution of the CT
variable is highly skewed, the correlation between CT and spread could be driven by some
outliers. To rule out this concern in Table 10 we replicate our empirical design using as main
explanatory variable a dummy variable taking value of 1 when there is at least a cross trade in
family f and month t, and equal to zero otherwise . We find the gap in performance between
high and low value funds to be 42 basis points (17 basis point considering risk-adjusted
returns) higher in families that cross-trade. This excludes that our results are driven by
outliers.
Another potential problem with our main methodology explained in Section 4 arises from
using as dependent variable in our regressions the spread in the performance between high
value and low value funds. In this way we cannot rule out that the correlation between
CT and the performance spread is driven only by one of the two parties of the transaction.
If that was the case, our results would be inconsistent with performance shifting through
cross-trading.
Hence, in Table 11 we replicate our regressions without matching funds. In particular,
all funds are divided in terciles according to the distribution of flows in the current month.
Funds displaying intermediate flows in month t are dropped. Hence, we create two separate
sub-samples. The first one containing only high-flow funds, the second one only low-flow
funds. In this way each sample contains only funds with relatively similar contemporaneous
flows.
Using this alternative methodology we do not need to impose that a family has at least
three funds to be included in our sample. Hence, our sample is much bigger containing 206
fund families and 1397 funds.
Results in columns 1 and 2 suggest that the performance of high value funds positively
correlates with the amount of cross-trades executed within their own family. Coe cients
21
reported in column 3 and 4 show that the performance of low value funds is negatively
correlated with the amount of cross-trades. Importantly coe cients are almost symmetric.
This result is consistent with the hypothesis that performance is shifted from outflow to
inflow funds through cross-trading.
Additionally, in Table 12 we replicate the results reported in Table 5 using lagged CT as
the main independent variable. Results stay unchanged. This finding relaxes concerns about
reverse causality bias. In particular, we want to rule out that a high spread in performance
triggers cross-trading activity. Consistent with a causal e↵ect of CT on performance, our
results do not change when we explore the e↵ect of past cross-trading activity on present
spread.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we explore the extent of cross-trading activity in mutual fund families and
its impact on fund performance. Previous proxies of cross-trades used in the literature rely
on quarterly holdings which makes a precise identification of cross-trades impossible. To
overcome this issue we exploit institutional trade level data provided by Ancerno. In order
to consider two opposite trades as a cross-trade, we require that the trades come from funds
belonging to the same fund family, are in the same stock, involve the exact same quantity of
shares traded, and share the same execution day, time and price. That provides us with a
much more reliable identification of cross-trades in mutual fund families.
Using this measure, we document that cross-trading activity is particularly high in large
and weak governance families with high fund size dispersion and before 2003. The same
families that cross-trade more are also more likely to cross-trade at prices unfairly far from
the VWAP of the day (up to a deviation of 2% per trade). This mispricing has a significant
impact on performance. We find that “star” funds performance in family that cross-trade
is boosted by 2.5% per year (1% risk adjusted), while the performance of the less valuable
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funds is reduced by the same amount. Since average monthly risk-adjusted performance
in our sample is slightly negative and non-statistically di↵erent from zero, this behavior
has obviously important implications for fund ranking, fund selection and fund manager
evaluation.
Mutual fund families have a fiduciary duty to treat all their clients equally. Using cross-
trading activity to favor the most valuable siblings makes economic sense since outperforming
funds attract disproportionate flows and have spillover e↵ects on the other a liated funds.
However, this practice breaches fiduciary duties toward investors since severely hurts the
performance of the less valuable funds in the family. Additionally, our results suggest that
fund alphas significantly misrepresent the real ability of fund managers to create value for
their investors. Studies on fund manager skill as well as investors choosing where to allocate
their money should consider the extent of cross-trading activity and its impact on performance
in their analyses. Finally, we find that governance is highly e↵ective in reducing unfair
cross-trading activity. In particular, both cross-sectional and time series variations in family
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Figure 2: Amount of cross-trading activity over time. Cross trading is computed for each family f in
month t as the dollar amount of cross traded positions scaled by its monthly total trading volume in USD.
SEC rules 38a-1 and 206(4)-7 and the amendments to rule 204-2 became e↵ective on February 5, 2004, while
the designated compliance date was October 5, 2004 (see the red vertical line). Average values are plotted for

















































































































































































































Figure 3: Mispricing of cross-trades over time. Mispricing is defined as the absolute deviation of a cross-
trade’s execution price from the volume-weighted average price of the day (VWAP). The blue straight line
represents mispricing weighted by the dollar volume of the trade, the red dashed line represents the standard
deviation of mispricings giving the same weight to each cross-trade. Average values are plotted for each
month weighting the amount of cross-trading by the number of funds belonging to a particular family
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Table 1: Summary Statistics
This table provides summary statistics over time for the CRSP Mutual fund database and the
CRSP-Ancerno matched sample. All the variables are annual averages of monthly averages.
Funds is the number of funds, Fund Size and Family Size are measured in USD millions,
Families is the number of families, Siblings is the number of funds in a family.
CRSP Mutual Fund Database
Fund Size Family Size
Year Funds Mean Median Siblings Families Mean Median
1999 1789 1082 115 8 224 8647 1402
2000 1799 1285 140 9 223 10387 1634
2001 1698 1136 142 8 213 9061 1463
2002 1634 1005 135 8 205 8031 1341
2003 1542 1012 145 8 195 7995 1312
2004 1457 1324 193 8 185 10403 1718
2005 1370 1525 212 8 177 11785 1929
2006 1297 1718 231 8 167 13334 2193
2007 1187 2050 277 8 155 15658 2534
2008 1138 1805 239 8 150 13679 2200
2009 971 1426 201 8 144 9608 1617
2010 775 1897 266 8 135 10921 1813
Ancerno-Crsp Match
1999 619 1846 148 14 46 24715 2529
2000 709 1842 163 14 55 23779 3094
2001 587 1729 178 15 43 23806 2636
2002 655 1615 191 14 48 21924 3142
2003 666 1493 197 14 49 20139 3289
2004 638 1953 274 14 49 25656 4109
2005 611 2097 339 13 49 26484 4385
2006 579 2271 370 13 46 28816 4373
2007 541 2629 445 13 42 33841 7143
2008 498 2370 403 14 38 31321 7604
2009 451 1771 354 13 38 20929 5015
2010 357 2362 491 13 36 23175 5442
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Table 2: Summary Statistics for fund-level and family-level regression
This table provides summary statistics for the pooled sample. Panel A shows fund level
variables and Panel B family level variables. Size is fund size measured in USD millions,
Excess return is fund return minus the risk-free rate, Alpha is the risk-adjusted return using
the Carhart (1997) four factor model, Fees are annual fund fees defines as ExpenseRatio+
1/7⇤ (FrontLoad+RearLoad), Flow is monthly flow defined as AUM(t) AUM(t 1)⇤(1+ret)AUM(t 1) , CT is
the family volume of cross-trades in USD divided by the family’s monthly trading volume in
USD. Siblings is the number of funds in the family, Weak Governance is a dummy variable
equal to 1 if the family was involved in a litigation for practices potentially hurting mutual
fund clients at any point in time, Size dispersion is the size di↵erence between the largest
and the smallest fund in the family divided by the average fund size in the family, Return
Dispersion is the monthly cross-sectional return standard deviation inside the family, Family
Size is assets under management of the family in USD millions.
Mean Stdev Percentiles
10 25 50 75 90
Panel A: Fund Level Summary Statistics
Size 1,688 5,687 9.600 44.90 222.7 940.5 3,379
Excess Return 0.00168 0.0554 -0.0641 -0.0258 0.00435 0.0321 0.0626
Alpha 0.000233 0.0231 -0.0229 -0.00990 -0.000330 0.00953 0.0238
Fees 0.0134 0.00647 0.00580 0.00910 0.0128 0.0177 0.0221
Flow(t) 0.00291 0.0606 -0.0360 -0.0170 -0.00492 0.0100 0.0419
Panel B: Family Level Summary Statistics
CT 0.00143 0.00950 0 0 0 0 0.000135
Return Dispersion (t-1) 0.0167 0.0115 0.00549 0.00893 0.0142 0.0216 0.0304
Siblings(t-1) 11.20 14.01 3 4 7 13 23
Family Size(t-1) 18,141 58,443 190.3 582.9 2,334 9,248 35,894
Size Dispersion(t-1) 3.827 2.938 1.207 1.919 2.976 4.736 7.734
Weak Governance 0.368 0.482 0 0 0 1 1
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Table 3: The cross-section of cross-trading activity
This table presents results of cross-sectional regressions studying the relationship between monthly cross-trading activity, fund
family characteristics and time-series changes in the mutual fund regulation. The dependent variable is a family’s monthly
volume of cross-trades in USD divided by the family’s monthly trading volume in USD. Siblings is the (log) number of funds
in the family, Weak Governance is a dummy variable that takes value one if a family was involved in a litigation for practices
potentially hurting mutual fund clients at any point in time, Size dispersion is the lagged size di↵erence between the largest
and the smallest fund in the family divided by the average fund size in the family, Return Dispersion is the lagged monthly
cross-sectional return standard deviation inside the family, Family Size is the log of assets under management of the family in
USD millions in month t-1, Post2003 is a dummy variable equal to one after 2003. Standard errors are clustered at the month
level.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Siblings 0.00294*** -0.00185***
(16.62) (-9.025)
Weak Governance 0.00192*** 0.000781***
(8.938) (4.140)
Size Dispersion 0.00111*** 0.00145***
(17.26) (13.93)
Return Dispersion 0.0570*** 0.0125*
(6.142) (1.664)




Constant -0.00457*** 0.000721*** -0.00283*** 0.000481*** -0.00665*** 0.00186*** -0.00177***
(-12.67) (9.145) (-11.47) (3.108) (-14.38) (16.40) (-5.339)
Time Fixed E↵ects Y Y Y Y Y N Y
Observations 9,343 9,343 9,343 9,184 9,329 9,343 9,170
R-squared 0.070 0.019 0.127 0.014 0.058 0.002 0.135
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Table 4: The cross-section of mispricing
This table presents results of cross-sectional regressions studying the relationship between the mispricing of cross-trades, fund
family characteristics and time-series changes in mutual fund regulation. Only cross-trades are included. The dependent variable
is the mispricing of a cross-trade defined as the absolute deviation of a cross-trades execution price from volume-weighted average
price of the day (VWAP). Siblings is the (log) number of funds in the family, Weak Governance is a dummy variable that takes
value one if a family was involved in a litigation for practices potentially hurting mutual fund clients at any point in time, Size
dispersion is the lagged size di↵erence between the largest and the smallest fund in the family divided by the average fund size
in the family, Return Dispersion is the lagged monthly cross-sectional return standard deviation inside the family, Family Size
is the log of assets under management of the family in USD millions in month t-1, Post2003 is a dummy variable equal to one
after 2003. Standard errors are clustered at the month level.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Siblings 0.0007*** -0.0005
(8.37) (-1.21)
Weak Governance 0.0014*** 0.0012***
(7.42) (3.52)
Size Dispersion 0.0001*** 0.0001*
(7.67) (1.80)
Returns Dispersion 0.0487*** -0.0062
(3.57) (-0.34)




Constant 0.0061*** 0.0079*** 0.0072*** 0.0073*** 0.0057*** 0.0105*** 0.0061***
(18.55) (65.63) (35.08) (16.87) (13.16) (65.72) (9.08)
Time Fixed E↵ects Y Y Y Y Y N Y
Observations 366,217 366,217 366,217 366,147 366,217 366,217 366,147
R-squared 0.216 0.216 0.216 0.215 0.216 0.032 0.216
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Table 5: Favoritism versus Performance Smoothing
This table presents results for regressions of spread on CT and controls. Each observation is obtained from the pairwise combinations of inflow funds
with ouflow funds conditional of belonging to the same family, in the same month and having the same investment style. spread is computed as
return (4-factor alpha) of inflow fund i (i.e., funds with flows in the top tercile of family f in a given month t) minus outflow fund j’s return (4-factor
alpha), i.e., funds with flows in the bottom tercile of family f in a given month t. Funds with flows in the intermediate tercile are dropped. CT is
computed as the percentage of cross-trades in family f in month t. The independent variables are: FamilySize, the natural log of the lagged assets
under management of the family; DSize, the di↵erence in the natural log of the lagged funds’ i and j total assets under management; DFlows, the
di↵erence in funds’ i and j lagged flows; DReturns, the di↵erence in funds’ i and j lagged returns; Size Dispersion, the size di↵erence between the largest
and the smallest fund in the family divided by the average fund size in the family; Returns Dispersion, the monthly cross-sectional return standard
deviation inside the family. The frequency of the observations is monthly. Time fixed e↵ects are included and errors are clustered at the time level.
The sample goes from 1999 to 2010.
Spread of Style adj. returns Spread of 4-factor alpha
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
CT 0.2749*** 0.1796*** 0.1777*** 0.1464*** 0.1712*** 0.0971*** 0.0956*** 0.0640***
(8.88) (5.62) (5.44) (4.13) (9.63) (5.07) (5.04) (2.92)
Family Size 0.0021*** 0.0021*** 0.0011*** 0.0017*** 0.0017*** 0.0007***
(9.14) (8.65) (3.81) (8.35) (8.80) (2.96)
DSize -0.0006* -0.0006* -0.0002 -0.0002
(-1.95) (-1.95) (-1.63) (-1.63)
DReturns 0.0215 0.0187 0.0025 -0.0000
(0.33) (0.29) (0.12) (-0.00)
DFlows -0.0164** -0.0165** -0.0142*** -0.0143***
(-1.99) (-2.00) (-2.99) (-3.01)
Returns Dispersion 0.2821*** 0.2523***
(4.10) (5.25)
Size Dispersion 0.0003* 0.0003**
(1.75) (2.40)
Constant 0.0071*** -0.0145*** -0.0142*** -0.0119*** 0.0050*** -0.0118*** -0.0116*** -0.0089***
(11.24) (-5.98) (-6.01) (-4.97) (13.81) (-5.68) (-5.78) (-5.09)
Time Fixed E↵ects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 106,220 106,123 105,734 105,640 106,220 106,128 105,734 105,640
R-squared 0.121 0.125 0.125 0.127 0.057 0.062 0.064 0.066
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Table 6: Mispricing of cross-trades and fund returns
This table presents results for regressions of spread on Value weightedMispricing and controls. Each observation is obtained from the pairwise
combinations of inflow funds with ouflow funds conditional of belonging to the same family, in the same month and having the same investment style.
spread is computed as return (4-factor alpha) of inflow fund i (i.e., funds with flows in the top tercile of family f in a given month t) minus outflow
fund j’s return (4-factor alpha), i.e., funds with flows in the bottom tercile of family f in a given month t. Funds with flows in the intermediate
tercile are dropped. Value weightedMispricing is computed as the tradesize weighted average of absolute deviations of cross-trades’ execution prices
from volume-weighted average prices in family f in month t. The independent variables are: FamilySize, the natural log of the lagged assets under
management of the family; DSize, the di↵erence in the natural log of the lagged funds’ i and j total assets under management; DFlows, the di↵erence
in funds’ i and j lagged flows; DReturns, the di↵erence in funds’ i and j lagged returns; Sizedispersion, the size di↵erence between the largest and the
smallest fund in the family divided by the average fund size in the family; ReturnDispersion, the monthly cross-sectional return standard deviation
inside the family. The frequency of the observations is monthly. Time fixed e↵ects are included and errors are clustered at the time level. The sample
goes from 1999 to 2010.
Spread of Style adj. returns Spread of 4-factor alpha
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Value weighted Mispricing 1.3713*** 0.6379*** 0.6236*** 0.4434*** 0.8499*** 0.3134*** 0.3123*** 0.1819*
(7.71) (4.36) (4.31) (3.58) (6.92) (2.92) (2.92) (1.89)
FamilySize 0.0031*** 0.0031*** 0.0006* 0.0022*** 0.0022*** 0.0004*
(11.70) (11.31) (1.90) (11.55) (12.07) (1.88)
DSize -0.0005* -0.0006* -0.0006* -0.0002 -0.0002
(-1.72) (-1.86) (-1.88) (-1.55) (-1.56)
DReturns 0.0232 0.0185 0.0038 0.0002
(0.35) (0.28) (0.17) (0.01)
DFlows -0.0173** -0.0172** -0.0146*** -0.0146***
(-2.09) (-2.08) (-3.06) (-3.06)
Returns Dispersion 0.3076*** 0.2606***
(4.30) (5.35)
Size Dispersion 0.0008*** 0.0006***
(5.41) (5.54)
Constant 0.0079*** -0.0236*** -0.0230*** -0.0109*** 0.0055*** -0.0171*** -0.0168*** -0.0084***
(13.30) (-8.06) (-8.13) (-4.65) (13.37) (-8.23) (-8.41) (-4.83)
Time Fixed E↵ects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 109,233 109,128 108,739 108,645 109,233 109,141 108,739 108,645
R-squared 0.107 0.121 0.119 0.123 0.047 0.059 0.061 0.065
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Table 7: Sorting on fees
This table presents results for regressions of spread on CT and controls. Each observation is obtained from the pairwise combinations of high-fee funds
with low- fee funds conditional of belonging to the same family, in the same month and having the same investment style. spread is computed as return
(4-factor alpha) of high-fee fund i (i.e., funds with fees in the top tercile of family f in a given month t) minus low-fee fund j’s return (4-factor alpha),
i.e., funds with fees in the bottom tercile of family f in a given month t. Funds with fees in the intermediate tercile are dropped. CT is computed as the
percentage of cross-trades in family f in month t. The independent variables are: FamilySize, the natural log of the lagged assets under management
of the family; DSize, the di↵erence in the natural log of the lagged funds’ i and j total assets under management; DFlows, the di↵erence in funds’ i and
j lagged flows; DReturns, the di↵erence in funds’ i and j lagged returns; Sizedispersion, the size di↵erence between the largest and the smallest fund in
the family divided by the average fund size in the family; ReturnDispersion, the monthly cross-sectional return standard deviation inside the family.
The frequency of the observations is monthly. Time fixed e↵ects are included and errors are clustered at the time level. The sample goes from 1999
to 2010.
Spread of Style adj. returns Spread of 4-factor alpha
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
CT 0.0399 0.0478* 0.0422 0.0497* 0.0345** 0.0394*** 0.0382** 0.0334*
(1.54) (1.83) (1.53) (1.73) (2.55) (2.61) (2.51) (1.96)
FamilySize -0.0002 -0.0003* -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0003
(-1.19) (-1.92) (-0.28) (-0.80) (-1.09) (-1.33)
DSize -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0001 -0.0001
(-1.48) (-1.52) (-0.91) (-0.89)
DReturns 0.0393 0.0392 0.0203 0.0203
(0.53) (0.53) (0.88) (0.88)
DFlows 0.0003 0.0003 -0.0021 -0.0022
(0.03) (0.03) (-0.45) (-0.46)
Returns Dispersion 0.0701 0.0300
(1.05) (0.58)
Size Dispersion -0.0002 0.0001
(-1.36) (0.48)
Constant 0.0006 0.0024 0.0031** 0.0010 -0.0003 0.0008 0.0011 0.0016
(1.24) (1.48) (2.15) (0.65) (-1.17) (0.58) (0.78) (1.20)
Time Fixed E↵ects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 108,350 108,330 107,833 107,739 108,350 108,330 107,833 107,739





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 11: Alternative methodology
This table presents results for regressions of excess returns and alphas on CT and controls. Each month funds
are sorted in three terciles on the basis of their contemporaneous flows. Funds displaying intermediate flows
are discarded. Regressions are ran separately for funds with flows in the top tercile (Inflow funds) and in
the bottom tercile (Outflow funds). The independent variables are: Siblings the log of the number of funds
in family f in month t, FamilySize, the natural log of the lagged assets under management of the family;
FundSize, the natural log of the lagged fund i total assets under management; PastFlows, fund i lagged flows;
PastReturns, fund i lagged returns; Sizedispersion, the size di↵erence between the largest and the smallest fund
in the family divided by the average fund size in the family; ReturnDispersion, the monthly cross-sectional
return standard deviation inside the family. The frequency of the observations is monthly. Time fixed e↵ects
are included and errors are clustered at the time level. The sample goes from 1999 to 2010.
Inflow funds Outflow funds
ex. rets alpha ex. rets alpha
(1) (2) (3) (4)
CT 0.0841*** 0.0418*** -0.0694*** -0.0386***
(3.69) (2.98) (-3.70) (-2.70)
Family Size 0.0002 0.0003*** -0.0003 -0.0001
(1.00) (3.23) (-1.65) (-0.62)
Fund Size -0.0000*** -0.0000*** -0.0000 0.0000
(-3.73) (-4.09) (-0.63) (0.53)
Returns Dispersion 0.1117* 0.0839** -0.0606 -0.0594**
(1.67) (2.49) (-1.19) (-2.25)
Size Dispersion 0.0000 0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001
(0.27) (1.19) (-0.71) (-1.59)
Past Flows -0.0052 0.0006 -0.0078 -0.0022
(-0.61) (0.18) (-0.97) (-0.47)
Past Returns 0.0761 0.0375* 0.0331 0.0057
(0.88) (1.66) (0.54) (0.34)
Constant 0.0016 -0.0026** 0.0030* 0.0005
(0.75) (-2.47) (1.91) (0.61)
Observations 36,403 36,403 35,442 35,442
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This paper finds that stock underpricing triggers underinvestment in research. To
identify underpricing, I build on previous literature on liquidity induced trading pres-
sure to develop an exogenous proxy of mispricing. This measure is based on funds that
underperform because of their over-exposure to an economically distressed industry and
are forced to sell stocks of healthy firms in unrelated industries for liquidity reasons.
As a consequence price drops below fundamentals and firms respond decreasing inno-
vation activity. The main empirical explanation which is consistent with this finding is
that underpriced firms prefer to divert resources from R&D into buying back their own
shares at a discount, in particular when financially constrained and held by impatient
shareholders.
⇤I am particularly grateful to Francesco Franzoni, Harald Hau, Roni Michaely, Martin Schmalz,
Rene´ Stulz, Alexander Eisele, Volodymyr Vovchak, Zexi Wang and participants to the Gerzensee
Doctoral Workshop for suggestions and useful comments. I acknowledge financial support from SFI,
Finrisk and University of Lugano (USI). Contact at gianpaolo.parise@usi.ch
 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2357615 
1 Introduction
There is little doubt that innovation is one of the main driving forces of economic
growth, and that private firms contribute substantially to the investment in the re-
search needed to nurture innovation activity. Yet our knowledge about the determi-
nants of a firm’s decision to invest in Research and Development (R&D) is still limited.
In fact, incentives of managers in private firms are not necessarily set to produce the
optimal level of innovation. On the one hand, managers are evaluated on a short-term
basis (Porter 1992). On the other hand, altough R&D spending generates abnormal
operating performance in the long-run, the market is slow to fully incorporate R&D
value into prices (Eberhart, Maxwell, and Siddique 2004). This paper analyzes how
price a↵ects a firm’s research spending decision and more specifically it tests whether
stock underpricing dampens innovation activity.
My analysis provides evidence for a causal e↵ect of the trading pressure induced by
institutional investors su↵ering liquidity shocks on R&D. The identification strategy
exploits the underperformance in the reported return over assets (ROA) of a particular
industry as an exogenous event that triggers outflows in the funds over-exposed to
that industry. These funds su↵er higher investor-redemptions than their peers and
are forced to liquidate non-distressed stocks (i.e., stocks that are unrelated with the
distressed industry and display better than average fundamentals). Fund Trading
Pressure (FTP) pushes these stocks below their fundamental value and triggers a
decrease in R&D spending.
The choice to use as an instrument a real shock in an industry which is economically
unrelated to the treatment group allows to study how R&D spending is set because of
a completely external event, ruling out the possibility that the change in firm policy
is motivated by reasons internal to the firm. In particular, stocks subject to FTP
at least once in a year display an average cumulative annual return of -5.5% (versus
19% of the rest of the sample), while they have better economic fundamentals and
greater past and future returns (i.e., they outperform in year t 1 and t+1). Such a
1
large drop in valuation may force managers to rethink their firm’s strategy, possibly
exploiting temporary mispricing to implement firm policies that create value, while
pushing the stock price back to its fundamental value.
What policies do underpriced firms favor? Previous literature documents that
when market valuation is low, firms are more reluctant to issue shares and more
likely to buy them back. In fact, timing share repurchases create value for sharehold-
ers and it is the main reason why managers start repurchasing programs (see, e.g.,
Ikenberry, Lakonishok, and Vermaelen (1995), Brav, Graham, Harvey, and Michaely
(2005), Chan, Ikenberry, and Lee (2007), Peyer and Vermaelen (2009)). I test and
find evidence supporting the hypothesis that underpriced firms divert resources from
R&D into buying back cheap shares in an attempt to “time the market”, i.e., exploit
downward price pressure to buy their own shares at a discount and earn from the
reversal to fundamentals.
In short, underpricing has a negative e↵ect on research1 which is magnified by the
fact that managers prefer to repurchase instead of issuing shares to finance innovation.
Consistent with this argument, I find that the reduction in R&D spending is signifi-
cantly more severe for financially constrained firms. Using the “AS index” proposed
by Hadlock and Pierce (2010), I classify firms in the two subsamples of the 33% most
financially constrained and 33% less financially constrained firms and I find that the
reduction of R&D spending triggered by stock underpricing in the first subsample is
about 10 times greater than the one in the second subsample.
Despite underinvesting in innovation may dampen long-run performance, this
choice may still be optimal when investors are not willing to wait for the research
value to be fully incorporated into prices. In particular, I show that the substitu-
tion between R&D and share repurchases is driven by firms mostly held by impatient
1Recent anecdotal evidence which supports this result is o↵ered by a New York Time article which
reports that Pfizer after a prolonged stock underperformance has decided to cut its research budget
and buy back an additional $5 billion worth of its own stock and that this is an increasing tendency
among American corporations (New York Times, November 21, 2011).
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investors (i.e., investors with high churn ratio). This result is consistent with the
short-horizon of impatient investors. In fact, impatient investors often do not hold
the stock long enough in their portfolio to fully acquire the benefits of R&D spending
(or to bear the cost of less innovation). Therefore, they will be better o↵ when firm
policies are short-term oriented. Similarly, a manager will prefer to shift resources
for buying back shares from R&D2 since its value is systematically overlooked by in-
vestors3 while, for instance, investors take into account capital investments when they
price stocks (Polk and Sapienza 2009).
This paper relates to a recent body of literature that documents a real (causal)
e↵ect of di↵erent proxies of stock underpricing on firm policies. Polk and Sapienza
(2009) measure mispricing using discretionary accruals, while Baker, Stein, and Wur-
gler (2003) rely on Tobin’s Q to study the e↵ect of mispricing on investments. Gao and
Lou (2011) use price pressure resulting from flow induced trading and look at stock is-
suance. Khan, Kogan, and Serafeim (2012) and Edmans, Goldstein, and Jiang (2012)
use Coval and Sta↵ord’s measure of flow induced mispricing to study respectively
SEOs and takeover probabilities. Hau and Lai (2012a) measure mispricing in non-
financial fire sales of mutual fund exposed to losses in their financial holdings during
the 2007-2008 crisis to look at the e↵ect on investments and employment.
However, all previous measures of mispricing have some limitations since they are
noisy proxies of mispricing4 (Polk and Sapienza (2009) and Baker, Stein, and Wurgler
2Empirical confirmation that R&D is regarded as “less important” is found also by Almeida, Fos,
and Kronlund (2013) although in a di↵erent setting: the authors show that firms use buybacks (and
decrease R&D) to meet EPS forecasts.
3There is increasing empirical evidence that markets do not account or misvalue R&D spending
when price is determined (see Eberhart, Maxwell, and Siddique (2004), Hirshleifer, Hsu, and Li
(2012), and Cohen, Diether, and Malloy (2013)).
4See Hau and Lai (2012a) for a detailed discussion.
3
(2003)), fail to properly account for endogeneity5 (Gao and Lou (2011), and to a
lesser extent Khan, Kogan, and Serafeim (2012) and Edmans, Goldstein, and Jiang
(2012)), or are limited to a specific period with unusual market conditions (Hau and
Lai 2012a). Conversely, the identification proposed in this paper generalizes the idea
presented in Hau and Lai (2012a) allowing to expand it outside the financial crisis.
Interestingly, using this improved identification methodology the e↵ect of mispricing
on investments is found to be much weaker than the one on R&D spending.
This paper relates to two other streams of literature: the first studies the increase
in the correlation between assets due to liquidity shocks, the second investigates the
impact of institutional ownership on corporate decisions. The first area comprises
studies about financial contagion like Jotikasthira, Lundblad, and Ramadorai (2012),
which shows that a liquidity shock to funds domiciled in developed countries and
investing in emerging countries can be propagated to foreign markets through forced
selling of emerging market stocks. Similar is also the result in Anton and Polk (2013),
which illustrates that common active mutual fund ownership increases stock return
correlation when some of the funds su↵er a liquidity shock. However, di↵erently from
those papers, my identification strategy starts a step earlier, investigating what is the
cause of the liquidity shock in order to disentangle between the distressed stocks that
caused the outflows in the first place and “good stocks” that are su↵ering because of
FTP.
For what concerns the second stream of literature, there is widespread consensus
that institutional investor holdings have some influence on firm policies. Parrino, Sias,
and Starks (2003) find that institutional ownership is negatively related to the proba-
bility of forced CEO turnover, while Aghion, Van Reenen, and Zingales (2013) explain
that managers of firms that have larger institutional investor ownership have more
5Previous literature assumes that fund flows are exogenous or random. This is hardly the case
when firm economic conditions or policy choices are incorporated into the price. In fact, fundamental
stock movements cause inflows or outflows in the funds holding the stock, consistent with a large
empirical evidence showing that investors chase returns.
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incentives to invest in R&D since they face lower risk of being fired if the research does
not pay out. Evidence of the e↵ect of institutional ownership on payout policies, and
in particular share repurchases, is more controversial. Grinstein and Michaely (2005)
find that institutions buy companies that regularly repurchase shares and avoid firms
that do not pay dividends. However, they do not find that institutional holdings or a
concentration of holdings have any impact on payout policies. Conversely, Desai and
Jin (2011) argue that firm managers adapt their payout policies to the preferences of
their institutional shareholders. Coherent with their result, this paper finds that un-
derpriced firms on average decrease R&D spending and boost share repurchases when
shareholders are impatient. Consistent with this evidence, Gaspar, Massa, Matos,
Patgiri, and Rehman (2013) show that payout policies are influenced by investors
impatience.
Summing up, this paper contributes to the current debate adding the following
results. Firstly, it shows that R&D spending is severely a↵ected by a firm’s stock
underpricing. This real e↵ect of underpricing is mainly due to firms attempt to time
the market, shifting resources from research into repurchasing underpriced securities.
The choice to forgo research projects that would create positive value in the future
is rational when investors prefer short-term value creation6. Coherently, this paper
finds that the substitution between R&D spending and share repurchases is driven
by firms held by impatient investors. Financial constraints also play a major role in
determining the decrease in R&D.
Secondly, this paper proposes a measure of stock mispricing that addresses more
carefully the issue of exogeneity to firm conditions respect to alternative measures
proposed by the literature. An increasing number of papers7 use fund liquidity induced
trades as an exogenous event to study firm policies. However, there is plenty of
evidence that investors chase returns, suggesting that funds holding ex-ante the best
(worst) performing assets will receive the highest (lowest) inflows. More specifically,
6See the theoretical model in the Appendix.
7See for instance Khan, Kogan, and Serafeim (2012) and Edmans, Goldstein, and Jiang (2012).
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previous fire sale measures do not identify the cause of the fund liquidity shock that is
assumed to be random or exogenous. However, this is not true if investors rationally
anticipate fund performance (see also Hau and Lai (2012a) and Hau and Lai (2012b))
or if the outflows are caused by fund holdings in distressed stocks.
Finally, this paper finds that profitability shocks originated at the firm level have
an influence on the policy choices of apparently unrelated firms through the trading
pressure of institutional investors holding both stocks. This result contributes to
explain how real shocks are transmitted through the financial markets, connecting
otherwise unrelated firms.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as following: Section 2 describes the data
used, Section 3 illustrates the methodology adopted to identify distressed funds and
compute FTP. In Section 4, empirical results are provided, showing evidence that FTP
has a negative e↵ect on R&D spending and a positive e↵ect on buybacks. The last
part of Section 4 addresses how financial constraints and investor impatience influence
R&D spending when a firm is underpriced. Section 5 provides additional evidence on
the robustness of the results, while Section 6 concludes.
2 Data
Fund information is collected from Thomson Financial/CDA Spectrum and CRSP
Mutual Funds and linked using the MFLINKS tables. Mutual fund holdings and
institutional investor holdings come from Thomson Financial/CDA and fund returns
from CRSP. Index, international, municipal bond, fixed income and balanced funds
are excluded.
Table 1 reports the number of funds, fund families and fund average size, quarterly
flows and returns for each year in the sample. In total the database contains 21 years
(1990-2010), 2943 funds and 500 fund families. Holdings and DHoldings are quarterly
variables while returns are at monthly frequency. Hence, the quarterly return is
6
computed as the cumulative return of the three monthly returns in a given quarter.




where TNAj,t are the assets under management of fund j in quarter t and r are
quarterly returns. Flow observations below -0.7 or above 2 are eliminated from the
sample similarly to Lou (2012) and Coval and Sta↵ord (2007). In this way the average
Flow in the sample is 3.8% per quarter and the median is 0%. Logarithm of Size and
FamilySize are used and the variables are lagged one month to avoid endogeneity
issues. All the other fund variables are from CRSP Mutual Fund Database.
To compute investor impatience, I rely mainly on the stock churn ratio8 computed
as in Yan and Zhang (2009) and lagged one year (to avoid that the churn ratio is
influenced by the firm’s policy):
CRj,t ⌘ min(ABuy j,t ,ASell j,t)
ÂNi=1
S j,i,t Pi,t+S j,i,t 1Pi,t 1
2
Where ABuy j,t and ASell j,t are respectively institution j’s aggregate purchase and
sale for quarter t, while Pi,t is stock i’s price in quarter t and S j,i,t the number of stock
i held by institution j in quarter t. Stock level churn ratio is computed summing
across di↵erent institutions the number of stocks held at the beginning of the quarter
weighted by institution’s churn ratio9.
8This measure of churn ratio is computed very similarly to Gaspar, Massa, and Matos (2005).
The main di↵erence is that Yan and Zhang (2009) use the minimum of aggregate purchase and
sale, whereas Gaspar, Massa, and Matos (2005) use the sum of aggregate purchase and sale. The
advantage of the former measure over the latter is that it minimizes the impact of investor cash flows
on portfolio turnover. However, the correlation between the two is above 90%.
9I alternatively (as robustness) define impatience on the basis of stock turnover computed as
the average of the total monthly volume traded in stock i over share outstanding lagged one year
(similarly to Polk and Sapienza (2009)) and I find similar results.
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For what concerns firm data, the sample used in this paper contains 8616 firms
divided in 223 industries identified with the first three digits of the SIC code10. All
observations are obtained from Compustat North America. Companies incorporated
outside of the United States are dropped. Financial companies and utility companies
are dropped as well. Only companies living at least 8 years (25% of the age distribu-
tion) are kept in the sample in order to avoid that results are driven by young tech
start-ups that disappear from the sample in a few years11 and do not buy back shares.
ROA is used to measure the profitability of a firm/industry. E[ROA] for an industry
is computed as the equally weighted ROA of all the firms with the same first 3-digit
SIC code in the corresponding quarter of the year, e.g., if the ROA of the automotive
industry for the first quarter of year 2009 has to be compared to E[ROA], the latter
will be computed as the average ROA for all automotive firms using only the first
quarters of the whole time series (i.e., observations of automotive firms from quarters
2, 3 and 4 will be dropped in order to account for seasonal di↵erences). Equally
weighting is used instead of value weighting in order to reduce the probability to
capture idiosyncratic shocks a↵ecting only a few large firms and not the majority of
the firms in that industry. Nonetheless, even in an industry that is underperforming
the average ROA there will be some firms with good financial returns12: therefore
when the whole industry is considered, an additional filter based on the stock returns
will be applied (see below). All variables are winsorized at the 1% level and their
construction is described in the Appendix.
Table 2 reports descriptive statistics for the whole sample of firms (column 1), firms
with (underpriced) stocks a↵ected by Fund Trading Pressure (FTP), defined as the
10An alternative approach would be to use Fama and French industries but since their categories
are much broader this would reduce the number of di↵erent industries and the analysis would be less
precise.
11Anyway including also younger firms leave the main results unchanged.
12Even though the equally weighted ROA is below the average of its distribution some observations
may fall into the right tail because of idiosyncratic features.
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forced sales of funds exposed to the distressed industry13 (column 2), and whether
the di↵erence between the two is statistically significant (column 3). Firms in the
FTP-Sample repurchase more stocks and spend less in R&D as a percentage of their
previous year dollar book assets14. Moreover, they have higher ROA and better past
stock performance (the annual di↵erence is 7.8%) than the average firm in the sample.
They also display on average more cash holdings, bigger size (measured as book value
in dollars), and less leverage even though the di↵erence is not statistically significant.
The fact that FTP stocks have better fundamentals and better past performance is
the result of a rational choice of mutual fund managers to sell well-performing, liquid
stocks in order to limit the price impact of their forced trades15.
As pointed out, firms subject to FTP display better ROA than the average firm in
the sample. In unreported results, I also find that these firms have a level of ROA that
is statistically greater than several benchmarks (i.e., they have better ROA than other
firms in the same industry, firms from other industries during the same year, and
firms in the same industry and the same year). This finding rules out the possibility
that the underperformance of FTP stocks is due to an economic connection with the
distressed industry rather than to mutual funds forced sales.
2.1 Identifying underperforming industries
As a first step industries that are less profitable (in terms of ROA16) than their average
in a particular quarter are identified17computing their Industry Performance:
DROAs,t = ROAs,t E[ROAs]
13See below.
14Alternative scaling measures are provided in Section 5.
15More on this in Section 3.
16The choice of using ROA instead, for example, of ROE is due to the fact that this variable is
reasonably exogenous, since it does not depend on stock movements.
17As an alternative identification strategy, I computed the Industry Performance as DROAs,t =
ROAs,t E[ROAs]
sROAs,t
. However, the results look qualitatively similar.
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Where s represents the industry identified from the first 3 digits of the SIC code
obtained from Compustat, and t is the time indicator. DROA is strongly correlated
with contemporaneous stock returns (see Figure 1). This is not surprising since in
e cient markets the price should be equal to the sum of the discounted cash flows
shareholders will receive (see, e.g., Chen, Da, and Zhao (2013)) and a diminished
return on asset reflects lower cash flows from the firm to the investor in the future. An
alternative approach would be to identify directly distressed firms from the di↵erence
between ROA and expected ROA, the advantage of controlling for the industry is
that it allows to exclude from the treatment group firms belonging to a distressed
industry and, as such, subject to similar economic conditions and shocks. I define the
bottom 10% of DROA distribution as distressed industries18. Deviation from average
ROA is a very persistent measure, which is strongly correlated over time. This is
due to the fact that a reduction in the profitability of an industry depends on several
factors that are usually long-lasting, such as a drop in the customer demand, increase
in the cost of raw materials, increase in the production cost, augmented competition
or simply the fact that an industry has reached its mature stage. As a consequence
the price of distressed stocks starts to decrease before the event quarter (i.e., the one
with the lowest ROA, computed as di↵erence between ROA and the average ROA of
the industry) and keeps decreasing afterward (see Figure 1).
3 Fund trading pressure
The literature o↵ers several examples of price divergence from fundamental value due
to limits of arbitrage19, investor bounded rationality20, and liquidity shocks21. Very
commonly used in the literature of contagion through mutual fund trading is the price
18Only the bottom 10% is considered in order to account only for the most severe situations.
However, the choice of di↵erent thresholds give qualitatively similar results.
19See Shleifer and Vishny (1997).
20E.g., Hong and Stein (1999)
21E.g., Coval and Sta↵ord (2007).
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pressure due to liquidity shocks with an identification a` la Coval and Sta↵ord (2007).
Unfortunately, this approach raises some concerns about endogeneity since both re-
turns cause flows and flows cause returns. Hence, Coval and Sta↵ord (2007) result
would be also consistent with rational investors anticipating poor fund performance22.
This paper takes a di↵erent approach to identify price swings due purely to trading
pressure: it computes price pressure motivated by liquidity needs of distressed funds
exposed to totally unrelated firms in economic distress. This approach resembles the
one proposed in Hau and Lai (2012b), in which the financial crisis is used as an ex-
ogenous event that triggers pressure on non-financial stocks, but has two advantages:
first, it is computable for the whole data sample (and not only for the financial crisis
period, i.e., 2007-2009) and second, it identifies as stocks a↵ected by FTP companies
that have better than average fundamentals (while, on the contrary, during the crisis
most of the firms were su↵ering also because they were exposed to the financial sec-
tor). In particular, the fact that FTP firms have better economic fundamentals than
comparable firms rules out the possibility that the price pressure of their stock is due
to economic contagion from the distressed industry.
When a shock hits only (or mainly) a specific industry, the funds that are exposed
the most to that industry in terms of stock holdings underperform the others. Hence,
there is a high chance that those funds will su↵er investor redemptions. High outflows
will force fund managers to liquidate not only distressed stocks but also healthy ones.
This is likely to happen for three reasons. Firstly, this will allow a fund to realize lower
losses since healthy stocks will usually sell at a lower discount than distressed ones
if markets are reasonably e cient23. Secondly, this behavior is consistent with the
“disposition e↵ect”, i.e., the tendency of investors to sell winners too early and hold on
to losers (e.g., Frazzini (2006)). Thirdly, it may be e cient from a tax perspective to
realize capital gains in periods of widespread distress when their investors are realizing
losses (Hau and Lai (2012a)).
22See also Hau and Lai (2012b).
23Table 2 shows that FTP-stocks had higher than average cumulative returns in the previous year.
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In order to identify underpriced stocks, I need first to detect the funds that are
selling for liquidity reasons, using a more exogenous measure than out f lows24. In
order to do so, I compute the Exposure of a fund to the distressed industries in the
following way:
Exposure j,t = Âi wi,t 1 ⇤ ( Returni,t)
where w is the dollar weight of the holdings of fund j in stock i only if i belongs
to a distressed industry (w would otherwise be equal to zero). Return is the quarterly
return25 of stock i in quarter t. For instance, if in quarter t the automotive industry is
in distress and fund j holds 10% of its portfolio in an automotive company which has
a return of -1%, Exposure would be 0.001. The higher is the exposure26 of a fund, the
higher will be the loss due to loading on the distressed industries. Among exposed
funds, i.e., funds with Exposure in the top decile, the median Exposure is equal to
1.3% and the average is 2%. Exposed funds have average flows of roughly 5% less
than non-exposed ones (see also Figure 2).
Moreover, in Table 4, it is shown that Exposure is negatively correlated with fund
flows. This allows me to condition a fund’s sales of non-distressed stocks to the ex-
posure to the distressed ones (i.e., while previous literature uses simply unconditional
flows) overcoming the endogeneity issue. Therefore, funds with high Exposure will be
forced to liquidate good stocks into the market, exercising downward price pressure.
My measure of mispricing will be necessarily biased toward stocks significantly
held by mutual funds. This is not a big concern since institutional holdings are tilted
toward bigger and liquid stocks that are more representative of the market. However,
in Section 5 I replicate my analysis using propensity score matching in order to leave in
24Stock prices depressed by unconditional outflows can be due to funds holding bad performing
companies.
25Using 4-factor alpha instead of stock return gives similar results.
26Funds with more than 90% of their portfolio holdings concentrated in a single industry are
dropped, in order to avoid to consider mutual funds that specialize only in that industry.
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the control sample only observations with similar stock characteristics. Fund trading
pressure is computed in the following way:
FTPi,t =
Â j((DHoldings j,i,t)|(Exp j,t 1>Pctile(90th)\(i/2DistressedIndustryt)))
SharesOutstandingt 1
Where DHoldings j,i,t 1 is the change in holdings of stock i during quarter t of
fund j. FTPi,t aggregates the selling of the 10% of the (distressed) funds with the
highest Exposure to the distressed industry (i.e., Exposure j,t>90th percentile). This
measure is similar in spirit to Coval and Sta↵ord (2007) with an important excep-
tions: distressed stocks (i.e., stocks of companies belonging to an underperforming
industry) are excluded a priori, making sure that the underperformance is not due to
fundamentals27.
Underpriced stocks are defined as those in the bottom 15% of the FTP distribution
(those that are more heavily sold by distressed funds). However, results using 10% or
20% thresholds look qualitatively similar.
Figure 1 illustrates what happens to FTP stocks. Consistent with results in Section
2, these stocks display better than average returns until distressed funds unload them
into the market because they need liquidity. During the distress quarter they reach
a cumulative average abnormal return28 of around -6%, reverting their trend in the
following quarters. In total, FTP stocks trade at a discount for 7-8 quarters, suggesting
that would be optimal for their managers to boost share repurchases.
Compared to the results in Coval and Sta↵ord (2007), fire sale stocks drop less
(the lowest cumulative returns reached is -6% versus -14% in Coval and Sta↵ord),
while they stay mispriced for a shorter period. This di↵erence is due to the fact that
27The issue that distressed funds are potentially selling these stocks because firms are decreasing
R&D is addressed computing ex-ante which stocks a distressed fund is more likely to sell due to
portfolio composition before the distress occurs.
28Cumulative average abnormal returns are computed as the average of quarterly stock returns
minus the average equally weighted return of stocks held by mutual funds in the previous quarter,
similarly to Khan, Kogan, and Serafeim (2012) and Coval and Sta↵ord (2007).
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in the identification used in this paper, distressed firms are a priori excluded. On the
contrary, in Coval and Sta↵ord (2007) distressed stocks are included when associated
to large outflows in the mutual fund industry29.
Figure 1 shows also cumulative abnormal returns for distressed stocks, identified as
stocks of firms in the bottom 15% of the ROA distribution30. Distressed stocks start to
drop some quarters before and keep underperforming after the distressed quarter. The
fact that their underperformance does not trigger immediately fund trading pressure
is consistent with the possibility of fund managers to meet early redemption using
their internal cash bu↵er (estimated around 4% on average by previous research31).
The protracted poor performance of distressed stocks suggests that profitability drops
at the industry level are long-lasting and correlated over time.
However, the main di↵erence in the pattern of distressed stocks and stocks su↵ering
because of FTP is what happens after the event quarter. Distressed stocks keep
underperforming the benchmark since their ability to generate revenues stays below
expectations. Conversely, stocks a↵ected by price pressure revert their pattern after
the quarter in which exposed funds sell them the most. This is what we should
expect since these stocks are not a↵ected by any fundamental shocks and exposed
funds, having already unloaded their holdings into the market, cannot induce further
downward price pressure. Hence, the non-fundamental price pressure is gradually
absorbed until the price reverts to its fundamental value.
The downward price pressure computed in this section is non-fundamental because
it is induced by a fundamental shock originated in a di↵erent industry. One could
argue that the same shock could hit a di↵erent industry to a lesser extent or that
the underperformance of the supposedly good stocks is due to an economic connec-
tion between the distressed industry and the industry to which the underpriced firm
29Distressed stock holdings trigger outflows since investors are more likely to withdraw their money
when a fund underperforms.
30The bottom 10% (or 20%) stocks display a similar pattern.
31Yan (2006).
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belongs. There are two main replies to this objection: first, after the event quarter
the price completely reverts to its original level in a relatively short time (this would
not happen if the shock is fundamental, the price after the drop should stay at the
bottom of the graph in Figure 132). Second, as it has been pointed out already in
Section 2, stocks in the FTP sample have better than average fundamentals, i.e., in
all specifications these firms display earnings over book assets greater than or equal
to the benchmark suggesting that these companies are economically healthy.
Hence, findings in this section are consistent with a price drop due to FTP that is
non-fundamental. Next section will use FTP as an exogenous shock to a firm’s price,
and will test whether this influences R&D spending.
4 Empirical findings
4.1 Underpriced stocks and underinvestment in R&D
Table 4 reports results from regressing ShareRepurchases on FTPDi,t , a dummy that
takes value one if a firm is in the bottom 15% of the FTP distribution33 in year t, and
control variables. Coe cients are estimated running OLS regressions including time
fixed e↵ects and either firm or industry fixed e↵ects. Errors are clustered both at the
firm and at the year level. The variable FTPDi,t aims at capturing the e↵ect on R&D
of mispricing due to mutual fund trading pressure. Di↵erently from similar literature,
firm belonging to distressed industries are ex ante excluded by the treatment group,
assuring that the e↵ect on R&D in not due to deteriorating fundamentals.
Across all columns of Table 4 coe cients of Fund Trading Pressure range from
-0.39% to -0.85% and are significant at the 1% level when firm fixed e↵ects are in-
cluded. This result documents an economically significant e↵ect of stock underpricing
on research spending. As an additional robustness test, results are replicated using
32Similarly to the distressed stocks.
33Results using 10% or 20% thresholds are qualitatively similar.
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propensity score matching in order to keep for each observation in the treatment group
only the most similar observation in the control group according to a selection of vari-
ables (e.g., industry, size, past returns, ROA). The regressions are also replicated
excluding all year-firm observations for which R&D spending is equal to zero to make
sure that they are not biasing the analysis. In both cases results are economically and
statistically stronger (see Section 5).
Control variables have the expected signs: large and profitable firms spend pro-
portionally less in R&D (the companies that spend proportionally more in R&D are
small tech companies). Large cash availability at the beginning of the year means
that a firm can spend more in research, and higher Tobin’s Q is generally associated
with better investment opportunities and, therefore, with higher R&D spending. Con-
versely, past stock returns and volatility do not play a clear role in explaining R&D
at time t.
The negative e↵ect of FTP on R&D is a economically relevant and surprising
result. In fact, Aghion, Van Reenen, and Zingales (2013) show that institutional
ownership on average fosters firm innovation. However, results in this section suggests
that institutional investors’ induced mispricing34 has a negative e↵ect on research
spending. This result survives also including institutional ownership from 13F as a
control. Therefore, my findings suggest that on average institutional ownership has a
positive e↵ect on research spending, unless outflows force funds to induce downward
price pressure on the stock.
Concluding, contemporaneous stock movements seem relevant in determining re-
search spending. This result expands a body of literature that highlights the e↵ect
of stock mispricing on several firm variables. However, a potential concern in the
interpretation of the result is that distressed fund managers may choose to liquidate
stocks of firms that are decreasing R&D (i.e., there is potentially a reverse causality
34Using S12 I am able to compute only mispricing induced by mutual fund outflows. Hence, my
measure of mispricing is by construction tilted toward stocks significantly held by mutual funds.
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bias). To make sure that there is a causal e↵ect of stock underpricing on firm R&D a
measure of expected fund trading pressure (E[FTP]) is computed. This variable does
not rely on actual sales but on the holdings of the distressed funds before the distress
(conditionally to the requirement that stocks do not belong to the distressed industry)
assuming that a distress fund is more likely to sell a stock that was already in its port-
folio before the distress period. Results obtained using this alternative identification
are qualitatively similar (see Section 5).
4.2 Underpriced stocks and buybacks
A sharp decrease in research spending triggered by underpricing suggests that a firm
has either less financial resources available or is diverting the resources that would
otherwise go to R&D into a di↵erent investment opportunity (or both). A source of
variation in the investment opportunity set of a firm is caused by the stock under-
pricing. When a firm’s stock is underpriced, managers will be more reluctant to issue
stocks at a discount (Khan, Kogan, and Serafeim 2012) and may find it convenient to
boost buybacks, increasing the value of the company.
Table 5 presents OLS regression results for the e↵ect of FTPD on annual share
repurchases35. The coe cients of FTPD are always positive and significant at the
1% level. The result provides strong evidence that some of the financial resources
of underpriced firms are transferred into buybacks. However, the marginal e↵ect of
FTPD on share repurchases is smaller in absolute value than the one on R&D (the
increase in buybacks explains roughly half of the decrease in R&D spending). Is this
di↵erence explained by the fact that underpriced firms are more reluctant to issue
shares to finance R&D since they are already buying their stocks back?.
To answer this question, I test how the incentive to cut research changes based on
firm’s financial constraints. In fact, firms that do not depend on external financing
35Results are replicated dropping firm-year observations when the dependent variable is equal to
zero, and stay qualitatively similar.
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may simply boost share repurchases using internal resources without a↵ecting their
research spending. Hence, I would expect to see a stronger reduction of R&D spending
in financially constrained firms. To investigate the importance of financial constraints,
I employ the AS index36 proposed by Hadlock and Pierce (2010). The authors show
that a measure based solely on age and size does a better job in identifying financially
constrained firms and is more robust and exogenous than the KZ index (Kaplan and
Zingales 1997).
Table 6 repeats the analysis in Table 4 for the two subsamples37 of the 33% most
financially constrained and unconstrained firms. Coherent with a negative e↵ect on
research also due to a greater di culty to secure external financing, coe cients of
FTPD for the most financially constrained firms are roughly ten times the value of
those for the most unconstrained ones (-1.8% versus -0.2%). However, to a lesser
degree some negative e↵ect on research spending is also found in unconstrained firms.
This suggests the presence of a (much weaker) substitution e↵ect between R&D and
share buybacks also in these firms. However, the fact that this result is strongly
driven by financially constrained firms rules out the possibility that underpriced firms
display lower R&D spending for some alternative firm specific reasons. Underpriced
firms that are unlikely to get funding from external sources are forced to cut expenses
to be able to buy back shares, and the type of expense that is more a↵ected by this
decision is the one in research.
Concluding, results in this section provide evidence that underpriced firms reduce
share issuance and boost buybacks to the detriment of R&D spending, and that this
is driven by financially constrained firms.
36The index is calculated as ( 0.737⇤Size)+(0.043⇤Size2)  (0.040⇤Age).
37Using 20% or 40% as threshold yields qualitatively similar results.
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4.3 Impatient investors and short term firm policies
Why do firm managers prefer to buy back underpriced shares instead of investing
in R&D? There are two possible explanations that are consistent with this finding.
First, repurchasing discounted shares is simply more profitable. Hence, a manager
would always maximize shareholders wealth diverting resources from research into
repurchases. Second, buying back discounted shares is more valuable than R&D
when investors are impatient. Mounting evidence is suggesting that R&D spending
is not rewarding in the short-term38. Moreover, investors are becoming increasingly
impatient and managers are often evaluated on quarterly results. Therefore, when
shareholders are focused on the short-term, it may be optimal to divert resources
from R&D into buying back underpriced shares. According to this second explanation
short-term investors maximize their utility when value is rapidly incorporated into the
price, therefore they neglect long-term investment opportunities since they discount
future cash flows at a higher rate. Similarly, managers may divert resources from
R&D at a low cost since shareholders do not penalize them for doing so.
Table 7 provides evidence for the e↵ect of FTPD on R&D for firms held by im-
patient versus patient investors. The first three columns report results for the 33%
of firms held by the most impatient investors (i.e., those mostly held by the investors
with the highest churn ratio), while the last three columns display the coe cients
for the subsample of the 33% of firms held by the most patient investors. Consis-
tent with the predictions of a simple theoretical model in which managers maximize
the utility of a representative impatient investor (see Appendix), results show that
firms for which the price is pushed below fundamentals display a 0.34% lower R&D
spending than similar firms when held by impatient investors. Conversely, firms held
by the most patient investors display an e↵ect of FTP on R&D which is statistically
non-di↵erent from zero.
38See Hirshleifer, Hsu, and Li (2012), Cohen, Diether, and Malloy (2013), and Eberhart, Maxwell,
and Siddique (2004).
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Overall, results in this section are consistent39 with the hypothesis that managers
working for firms held by impatient shareholders rationally focus firm’s financial re-
sources into shorter-term policies.
5 Robustness tests
5.1 Expected Fund Trading Pressure
Results in Section 4 provides evidence of a causal e↵ect of FTP on research. The
methodology proposed allows to identify underpriced stocks without running into the
risk that the drop in the price is due to firm fundamentals. However, the evidence
presented does not exclude the possibility that distressed fund managers prefer to
liquidate firms that are decreasing R&D. This is probably not true since previous
literature documents that investors overlook R&D and prefer to hold firms that are
increasing buybacks (like the firms in my treatment group).
However, this section provides an identification of expected fund trading pressure
which is exogenous to fund managers’ preferences on which stock to sell.
E[FTPi,t ] =
Â j((Shares j,i,t 1)|(Exp j,t 1>Pctile(90th)\(i/2DistressedIndustryt)))
SharesOutstandingt 1
Where Shares j,i,t 1 are the holdings in stock i at the end of period t 1 of fund j
entering into a distressed situation in t. E[FTPi,t ] aggregates the selling of the 10% of
the funds with the highest Exposure to the distressed industry (i.e., Exposure j,t>90th
percentile). This measure computes in which stocks the portfolios of distressed funds
are more concentrated (provided that they do not belong to the distressed industry)
before the distress. These stocks are more likely to be liquidated when a fund needs
liquidity compared to stocks that funds do not hold yet, or hold in a small quantity.
39However, potentially there can be a reverse causality bias if impatient investors anticipate stock
mispricing and firm short-term policies. Results in Section 4.3 merely illustrate correlation between
impatient investor holdings and firm short term focus and do not claim any causality.
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Table 8 shows that the e↵ect of E[FTP] on R&D is negative and significant. How-
ever, the statistical significance is lower since this measure of mispricing is necessarily
more imprecise.
5.2 Subsamples
Table 9 replicates results in Table 4 dividing the whole sample in two decades (1990-
2000, 2001-2010) to make sure that the result is not driven by particular market
conditions or is changing over time. Coe cients for the FTPD dummy suggest that
the negative e↵ect on R&D was slightly stronger in the 1990-2000 decade. However,
the result is robust and survives over time (all coe cients are significant at the 1%
level).
5.3 Propensity score matching
Another potential issue is that distressed fund managers pick stocks with character-
istics correlated to lower R&D when they decide to sell because they need liquidity.
The underlying assumption in investigating the e↵ect of the underpricing on the firm
policies is that fund managers choice is quasi-random. However, from Section 3 we
know that distressed fund managers are more likely to sell stocks that outperformed
in the past and have better than average fundamentals. To overcome this concern,
Table 10 replicates the main results matching the control sample on the main char-
acteristics of the treatment group (i.e., industry, size, past-returns, ROA). A logistic
regression is run in order to find which observation in the control group is the most
likely to end up in the treatment group according to similarity in the control variables
and only this observation is kept as control (i.e., for each underpriced firm I have a
non-mispriced firm with similar characteristics). However, results look qualitatively
similar.
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5.4 Di↵erent scaling of R&D
Table 11 replicates results in Table 4 scaling R&D expenditures over market value
instead of book value, to make sure that the result is not driven by the choice of the
denominator. However, results look qualitatively similar.
6 Conclusions
Economic development is driven and sustained by innovation activity. However, firms
find more convenient to underinvest in research in order to have more resources to
buy back shares when their stock is underpriced. This paper proposes a methodology
to identify underpricing which is exogenous to firm characteristics (di↵erently from
the liquidity induced sales a` la Coval and Sta↵ord (2007) commonly used in the
literature), and finds that underpricing triggers a reduction in research spending.
The identification proposed exploits the economic distress of an industry, identi-
fied by a decrease in the average profitability (ROA), to show that over-exposed funds
(i.e., funds with holdings concentrated in that industry) sell stocks of healthy firms
in unrelated industries, driving down their price. This channel is relatively new since
most of the literature focuses on the transmission of “pure liquidity” shocks, assuming
that they are random (while this is not necessarily true) and presents the advan-
tage of being more exogenous. Moreover, the fact that firms with stocks a↵ected by
fund trading pressure have better than average fundamentals rules out the possibility
that the stock underperformance is due to an economic connection with firms in the
distressed industry.
A growing body of literature is focusing on describing the influence of mutual funds
on the real economy and this paper aims at contributing to the ongoing debate. In
particular, this paper shows that a firm’s stock underpricing has a real e↵ect on R&D
spending because, on average, underpriced firms prefer to substitute R&D with share
repurchases. This e↵ect is particularly strong for financially constrained firms and
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firms held by impatient investors. The choice to decrease the resources dedicated to
R&D is consistent with a growing literature on limited investor attention that shows
that investors overlook or are not able to assess the importance of research spending.
Hence, such a strategy can be rational especially when shareholders are impatient
(i.e., they have a high churn ratio).
Concluding, the choice to shift resources that would otherwise go into R&D hap-
pens because R&D is considered a relatively “flexible” expense. In fact, markets
overlook its real contribution to value creation and do not penalize managers for
undermining firm future innovation potential. The negative e↵ect of underpricing on
research is particularly strong for firms held by impatient investors. Dividing observa-
tions in two subsamples of firms held by shareholders with the highest and the lowest
churn ratio, I find that the result is driven by the former group. This is consistent with
recent empirical evidence suggesting that the value of R&D is slowly impounded into
prices. Moreover, empirical results provide evidence consistent with the hypothesis
that impatient investors foster short-term firm strategies.
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7 Appendix A: Construction of the Variables
R&D spending is R&D spending over book assets at the beginning of the year.
Share Repurchases is dollar share repurchases over book assets at the beginning of
the year.
Cash is Cash over Book Assets available at the beginning of the year.
FTPD is a dummy variable that takes value one if in at least one quarter of the year
FTP was below the 10th percentile of its distribution.
Leverage is long-term liabilities over book assets at the beginning of the year.
TQ is Tobin’s Q computed as the sum of market equity and book assets less book
equity, deferred taxes, and investment tax credits over book assets.
ROA is EBITDA over book assets at the beginning of the year.
Size is the log of book assets.
Past Stock Returns is the cumulative return of the stock in year t 1.
Past Stock Volatility is the standard deviation of stock monthly returns in year t 1.
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8 Appendix B: Theoretical framework
This section presents a simple model that explains why managers maximize the utility
of impatient shareholders passing up valuable research projects in order to buy back
underpriced securities. The setup and intuition behind the model follow closely Stein
(1996) and Polk and Sapienza (2009).
I consider an underpriced firm that can allocate its capital K either to research,
R, or to repurchase shares for an amount K R. K is given and comprises the dollar
amount of all available internal resources. R is continuous and homogeneous and
decided by the manager. The stock underpricing, at , depends on the mispricing level
a  0 and is gradually corrected at a rate p  0, i.e., at = a⇤ e pt .
Shareholders face a liquidity shock that force them to sell their shares at time
t + u. The arrival of the liquidity shock, q j, follows a Poisson process with mean
arrival rate q j 2 [0,•). q j increases with investor’s impatience (i.e., high q j indicates
high impatience, while low q j means that the investor is patient40). The research
pays with probability p an amount log(R), which increases slowly over time at a rate
i< q, since the value of research is progressively incorporated into the price, and pays
0 with probability 1 p. The cost of research is R.
A rational manager who wants to maximize the utility of a representative investor





plog(R)eit +(K R)(1+a⇤ e pt)⇤q je q jtdt  (R R0)
That is, investor’s utility is a function of the value generated by the innovation (i.e.,
the outcome of the investment in research) and the value generated by repurchasing
mispriced stocks. If the mispricing of the stock is zero (a = 0), buying back shares
does not increase shareholder’s wealth. Similarly, if the probability of the innovation is
zero (p= 0), to invest in R&D decreases the utility of the investor. In fact, investing in
40In this model an impatient investor is defined as an investor j who is forced to liquidate the
stock soon, as in Polk and Sapienza (2009).
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R&D may have a negative expected value, either because the innovation probability is
low (p is small) or because the liquidity shock is expected to occur soon (q j is high41).
It is assumed that the value generated by the stock after t+u, i.e., after the investor
exits her position, does not increase her utility. The optimal level of investment in






Hence, the higher the mispricing the greater will be the incentive of the manager
to divert resources from research into buying back shares. More importantly, this
incentive will increase with j’s investor impatience. Conversely, research spending
increases with the innovation rate, i, the probability of a successful outcome, p, and
the speed of the price reversal, p.
As expected, if the probability of the innovation to occur is zero (p= 0) all money
will go into buybacks. Conversely, when the mispricing is zero, the optimal level of
research still depends on p and q j. However, for p = 1 and i that approaches q j the
investment in research will spike (and buybacks will fall toward zero), suggesting that
the investor is better o↵ patiently investing in R&D and waiting for the innovation to
create value in the long-run.
Summing up, the optimal strategy for a rational manager who maximizes investor
j’s utility will be to focus on buying back underpriced shares when investors are
impatient (q j is high), while investing more in research when they are patient (q j is
low).
41The net value of the innovation at the initial stage t = 0 is negative even if p= 1, i.e., log(R) R<
0, since its value is slowly incorporated into the price. Hence, the investor needs to hold the stock
for a su ciently long period for the investment in R&D to become convenient.
26
References
Aghion, Philippe, John Van Reenen, and Luigi Zingales, 2013, Innovation and insti-
tutional ownership, American Economic Review.
Almeida, Heitor, Vyacheslav Fos, and Mathias Kronlund, 2013, The real e↵ects of
share repurchases, Available at SSRN.
Anton, Miguel, and Christopher Polk, 2013, Connected stocks, The Journal of Fi-
nance.
Baker, Malcolm, Jeremy C Stein, and Je↵rey Wurgler, 2003, When does the market
matter? stock prices and the investment of equity-dependent firms, The Quarterly
Journal of Economics 118, 969–1005.
Brav, Alon, John R Graham, Campbell R Harvey, and Roni Michaely, 2005, Payout
policy in the 21st century, Journal of Financial Economics 77, 483–527.
Chan, Konan, David L Ikenberry, and Inmoo Lee, 2007, Do managers time the market?
evidence from open-market share repurchases, Journal of Banking & Finance 31,
2673–2694.
Chen, Long, Zhi Da, and Xinlei Zhao, 2013, What drives stock price movements?,
Review of Financial Studies 26, 841–876.
Cohen, Lauren, Karl Diether, and Christopher Malloy, 2013, Misvaluing innovation,
Review of Financial Studies 26, 635–666.
Coval, Joshua, and Erik Sta↵ord, 2007, Asset fire sales (and purchases) in equity
markets, Journal of Financial Economics 86, 479–512.
Desai, Mihir A, and Li Jin, 2011, Institutional tax clienteles and payout policy, Journal
of Financial Economics 100, 68–84.
27
Eberhart, Allan C, William F Maxwell, and Akhtar R Siddique, 2004, An examina-
tion of long-term abnormal stock returns and operating performance following r&d
increases, The Journal of Finance 59, 623–650.
Edmans, Alex, Itay Goldstein, and Wei Jiang, 2012, The real e↵ects of financial
markets: The impact of prices on takeovers, The Journal of Finance 67, 933–971.
Frazzini, Andrea, 2006, The disposition e↵ect and underreaction to news, The Journal
of Finance 61, 2017–2046.
Gao, Pengjie, and Dong Lou, 2011, Cross-market timing in security issuance, in AFA
2012 Chicago Meetings Paper.
Gaspar, Jose´-Miguel, Massimo Massa, and Pedro Matos, 2005, Shareholder investment
horizons and the market for corporate control, Journal of Financial Economics 76,
135–165.
, Rajdeep Patgiri, and Zahid Rehman, 2013, Payout policy choices and share-
holder investment horizons, Review of Finance 17, 261–320.
Grinstein, Yaniv, and Roni Michaely, 2005, Institutional holdings and payout policy,
The Journal of Finance 60, 1389–1426.
Hadlock, Charles J, and Joshua R Pierce, 2010, New evidence on measuring financial
constraints: Moving beyond the kz index, Review of Financial Studies 23, 1909–
1940.
Hau, Harald, and Sandy Lai, 2012a, Real e↵ects of stock underpricing, Journal of
Financial Economics.
, 2012b, The role of equity funds in the financial crisis propagation, Swiss
Finance Institute Research Paper.
28
Hirshleifer, David, Po-Hsuan Hsu, and Dongmei Li, 2012, Innovative e ciency and
stock returns, Journal of Financial Economics.
Hong, Harrison, and Jeremy C Stein, 1999, A unified theory of underreaction, mo-
mentum trading, and overreaction in asset markets, The Journal of Finance 54,
2143–2184.
Ikenberry, David, Josef Lakonishok, and Theo Vermaelen, 1995, Market underreaction
to open market share repurchases, Journal of Financial Economics 39, 181–208.
Jotikasthira, Chotibhak, Christian Lundblad, and Tarun Ramadorai, 2012, Asset fire
sales and purchases and the international transmission of funding shocks, The Jour-
nal of Finance 67, 2015–2050.
Kaplan, Steven N, and Luigi Zingales, 1997, Do investment-cash flow sensitivities pro-
vide useful measures of financing constraints?, The Quarterly Journal of Economics
112, 169–215.
Khan, Moza↵ar, Leonid Kogan, and George Serafeim, 2012, Mutual fund trading
pressure: Firm-level stock price impact and timing of seos, The Journal of Finance
67, 1371–1395.
Lou, Dong, 2012, A flow-based explanation for return predictability, Review of finan-
cial studies 25, 3457–3489.
Parrino, Robert, Richard W Sias, and Laura T Starks, 2003, Voting with their feet:
institutional ownership changes around forced ceo turnover, Journal of financial
economics 68, 3–46.
Peyer, Urs, and Theo Vermaelen, 2009, The nature and persistence of buyback anoma-
lies, Review of Financial Studies 22, 1693–1745.
Polk, Christopher, and Paola Sapienza, 2009, The stock market and corporate invest-
ment: A test of catering theory, Review of Financial Studies 22, 187–217.
29
Porter, Michael E, 1992, Capital disadvantage: America’s failing capital investment
system., Harvard business review 70, 65.
Shleifer, Andrei, and Robert W Vishny, 1997, The limits of arbitrage, The Journal of
Finance 52, 35–55.
Stein, Jeremy C, 1996, Rational capital budgeting in an irrational world, Discussion
paper National Bureau of Economic Research.
Yan, Xuemin Sterling, 2006, The determinants and implications of mutual fund cash
holdings: Theory and evidence, Financial Management 35, 67–91.
, and Zhe Zhang, 2009, Institutional investors and equity returns: Are short-


















Figure 1: Cumulative Average Abnormal returns from three quarters before to five quarters after
a “distress quarter”. Distress quarter is defined as a quarter in which either a stock is in the bottom
15% of the FTP (Fund Trading Pressure) distribution, or in the bottom 15% of the DROA distribution
(i.e., it is a distressed stock). Abnormal returns are computed as quarterly stock returns minus the
equally weighted returns of quarterly mutual fund holdings (similarly to Coval and Sta↵ord (2007)).
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Table 1: Fund summary statistics
This table reports fund sample statistics at the annual level. Only equity funds that invest in domestic stocks are
included (Inv. Obj.=2, 3, 4, or missing provided that the fund reports to S12). The assets under management (TNA)
are in million dollars. Qtr. Flow and Qtr. Return are respectively the annual average among quarterly fund flows
defined as in Section 3 and quarterly fund returns.
Year N. Funds N. Families TNA Qtr. Flows Qtr. Returns
1990 812 243 301 0.03 -0.01
1991 893 264 356 0.07 0.07
1992 1018 289 424 0.10 0.02
1993 1216 314 518 0.11 0.04
1994 1462 351 539 0.06 0.00
1995 1622 373 594 0.06 0.06
1996 1781 400 706 0.07 0.04
1997 2000 431 772 0.07 0.05
1998 2219 469 835 0.04 0.03
1999 2299 464 889 0.03 0.07
2000 2303 459 1013 0.02 0.00
2001 2136 443 855 0.02 -0.01
2002 2031 436 787 0.01 -0.04
2003 1861 418 897 0.01 0.07
2004 1692 402 1149 0.00 0.03
2005 1612 383 1340 0.00 0.02
2006 1514 364 1513 -0.01 0.03
2007 1444 353 1723 -0.02 0.02
2008 1347 342 1374 -0.01 -0.11
2009 1283 326 1254 -0.01 0.08
2010 1189 320 1464 -0.01 0.04
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Table 2: Firm summary statistics
This table reports firm annual sample statistics. All firms not incorporated in the US are excluded. Utilities and
financial companies are excluded as well. FTP Sample includes firms a↵ected by Fund Trading Pressure in a given
year. Column 3 reports whether for each firm variable the di↵erence between the full sample and the FTP sample is
statistically significant at the 10% (*), 5% (**), or 1% (***). Variable construction is explained in the Appendix. The
sample goes from 1990 to 2010.
Full Sample FTP Sample Di↵erence
Variable (1) (2) (1) - (2)
Book Assets 1688 1888
Share Repurchases 0.0144 0.0239 ***
R&D 0.0971 0.0870 ***
ROA 0.0551 0.1024 ***
Cash 0.1347 0.1383
Leverage 0.2427 0.2123
Tobin’s q 2.4359 2.0172
Stock Return(t-1) 0.1791 0.2577 ***
Stock Volatility(t-1) 0.1652 0.1628
34
Table 3: Exposure and flows
This table reports coe cients from an OLS regression of mutual fund Flows on fund Exposure and control variables.
Exposure is the exposure of a fund to the distressed industries computed as Exposure j,t = Âi wi,t 1 ⇤ ( Returni,t). Size is
the log of assets under management, FamilySize is the log of assets under management at the family level, Exp.Ratio
and TurnoverRatio are respectively the expenses and the turnover of a fund. Errors are clustered at the fund level. The
observations have quarterly frequency. The data sample goes from 1990 to 2010.
Dep.Variable:
Fund Flows (1) (2) (3) (4)
Dist.Industry Exposure -0.244*** -0.259*** -0.254*** -0.258***
(-7.57) (-6.86) (-6.64) (-3.53)
Fund Size 0.001 -0.001
(0.79) (-0.50)










Constant 0.017*** -0.031*** -0.028*** -0.040***
(13.77) (-19.08) (-5.03) (-2.58)
Style Fixed E↵ect N Y Y Y
Time Fixed E↵ect N Y Y Y
Observations 44,246 41,581 41,479 17,641
R-squared 0.008 0.041 0.040 0.064
t-statistics in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 4: Do underpriced firms spend less in R&D?
This table reports coe cients from a linear regression of R&D spending over book assets at the beginning of the year
on FTPD and controls. FTPD is a dummy variable that takes value one if the price of the stock was subject to FTP for
at least one quarter in year t, and zero otherwise. Time, industry, and firm fixed e↵ects are included when indicated.
Control variables are described in the Appendix. The observations have annual frequency. Errors are clustered both
at the firm and the time level (two-dimensional clustering). The data sample goes from 1990 to 2010.
Dep.Variable:
Annual R&D Spending
over Book Assets (1) (2) (3) (4)
FTPD -0.0085*** -0.0056*** -0.0039** -0.0054***
(-6.77) (-4.57) (-2.40) (-4.38)
Size -0.0207*** -0.0053*** -0.0199***
(-19.26) (-13.97) (-18.79)
ROA -0.0113*** -0.0456*** -0.0103***
(-4.28) (-9.92) (-3.86)
Cash 0.0194*** 0.1217*** 0.0169***
(3.56) (21.46) (3.07)
TQ 0.0064*** 0.0082*** 0.0062***
(12.77) (10.89) (10.73)
Past Stock Returns -0.0028** 0.0015*
(-2.47) (1.90)
Past Stock Volatility 0.0689*** -0.0023
(8.52) (-0.36)
Constant 0.0810*** 0.1882*** 0.0640*** 0.1825***
(42.65) (28.13) (15.64) (26.69)
Time Fixed E↵ects Y Y Y Y
Industry Fixed E↵ects N N Y N
Firm Fixed E↵ects Y Y N Y
Observations 37,945 36,869 36,166 36,166
R-squared 0.743 0.768 0.503 0.772
Robust t-statistics in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 5: Do underpriced firms boost buybacks?
This table reports coe cients from a linear regression of dollar share repurchases over book assets at the beginning of
the year on FTPD and controls. FTPD is a dummy variable that takes value one if the price of the stock was subject
to FTP for at least one quarter in year t, and zero otherwise. Time, industry, and firm fixed e↵ects are included
when indicated. Control variables are described in the Appendix. The observations have annual frequency. Errors are
clustered both at the firm and the time level (two-dimensional clustering). The data sample goes from 1990 to 2010.
Dep.Variable:
Annual Share Repurchases
over Book Assets (1) (2) (3) (4)
FTPD 0.0029*** 0.0022*** 0.0026*** 0.0021***
(4.10) (3.05) (3.25) (2.89)
Size 0.0028*** 0.0032*** 0.0024***
(9.86) (27.01) (8.00)
ROA 0.0038*** 0.0102*** 0.0043***
(7.69) (12.32) (7.80)
Cash 0.0151*** 0.0199*** 0.0166***
(8.75) (13.04) (9.27)
TQ 0.0003*** 0.0015*** 0.0004***
(2.93) (9.27) (3.05)
Past Stock Returns -0.0000 0.0003
(-0.16) (1.30)
Past Stock Volatility -0.0340*** -0.0207***
(-15.63) (-9.86)
Constant 0.0182*** -0.0022 -0.0003 0.0038*
(20.96) (-1.15) (-0.22) (1.80)
Time Fixed E↵ects Y Y Y Y
Industry Fixed E↵ects N N Y N
Firm Fixed E↵ects Y Y N Y
Observations 51,116 49,707 48,823 48,823
R-squared 0.329 0.333 0.117 0.339
Robust t-statistics in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 6: Do financially constrained firms decrease R&D more?
This table reports coe cients from a linear regression of R&D spending over book assets at the beginning of the year
on FTPD and controls. FTPD is a dummy variable that takes value one if the price of the stock was subject to FTP for
at least one quarter in year t. Financially constrained firms are defined on the basis of the AS index (see Section 4).
Firms in the bottom 33% of the AS distribution are considered financially unconstrained, firms in the top 33% of the
distribution are considered financially constrained. Control variables are described in the Appendix. The observations
have annual frequency. Errors are clustered both at the firm and the time level (two-dimensional clustering). The
data sample goes from 1990 to 2010.
Dep.Variable: Financially Constrained Financially Unconstrained
Annual R&D Spending
over Book Assets (1) (2) (3) (4)
FTPD -0.0232*** -0.0175** -0.0017 -0.0022**









Past Stock Returns -0.0015 0.0009
(-0.94) (1.27)
Past Stock Volatility 0.0060 -0.0261***
(0.58) (-2.70)
Constant 0.1940*** 0.2174*** 0.0391*** 0.0628***
(14.57) (14.21) (35.70) (5.36)
Time Fixed E↵ects Y Y Y Y
Firm Fixed E↵ects Y Y Y Y
Observations 10,165 9,673 13,523 12,634
R-squared 0.749 0.781 0.765 0.780
Robust t-statistics in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 7: Do impatient firms decrease R&D more?
This table reports coe cients from a linear regression of R&D spending over book assets at the beginning of the
year on FTPD and controls. FTPD is a dummy variable that takes value one if the price of the stock was subject
to FTP for at least one quarter in year t. The header “Impatient Investors” (columns 1, 2, and 3) indicates firms
that are in the highest 33% “impatience” percentile. Conversely, the header “Patient Investors” (columns 4, 5, and 6)
indicates firms that are in the lowest 33% “impatience” percentile. Impatience is computed on the average churn ratio
of investors who held the stock in year t 1, as explained in Section 2. Control variables are described in the Appendix.
The observations have annual frequency. Errors are clustered both at the firm and the time level (two-dimensional
clustering). The data sample goes from 1990 to 2010.
Dep.Variable: Impatient Investors Patient Investors
Annual R&D Spending
over Book Assets (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
FTPD -0.0037*** -0.0048** -0.0034** -0.0121* 0.0077 -0.0070
(-2.58) (-2.57) (-2.37) (-1.76) (0.88) (-1.06)
Size -0.0062*** -0.0158*** -0.0075*** -0.0128***
(-9.34) (-8.25) (-5.34) (-5.30)
ROA -0.0534*** -0.0246*** -0.0475*** -0.0045
(-5.83) (-4.04) (-7.00) (-1.06)
Cash 0.0810*** 0.0225** 0.1304*** 0.0128
(8.82) (2.32) (12.62) (1.18)
TQ 0.0096*** 0.0074*** 0.0078*** 0.0064***
(11.52) (8.99) (5.82) (5.43)
Past Stock Returns -0.0029** 0.0004 -0.0057*** -0.0019
(-2.44) (0.39) (-3.20) (-1.32)
Past Stock Volatility 0.0737*** -0.0272** 0.0540*** -0.0004
(5.00) (-2.41) (4.54) (-0.05)
Constant 0.0640*** 0.0729*** 0.1691*** 0.1217*** 0.0719*** 0.1442***
(35.49) (10.97) (11.68) (14.89) (5.92) (11.60)
Time Fixed E↵ects Y Y Y Y Y Y
Industry Fixed E↵ects N Y N N Y N
Firm Fixed E↵ects Y N Y Y N Y
Observations 12,386 11,736 11,736 10,533 9,964 9,964
R-squared 0.795 0.540 0.818 0.778 0.474 0.806
Robust t-statistics in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 8: Expected Fund Trading Pressure and R&D
This table reports coe cients from a linear regression of R&D spending over book assets at the beginning of the year
on E[FTPD] and controls. E[FTPD] is a dummy variable that takes value one if a stock is likely to be subject to FTP
for at least one quarter in year t, and zero otherwise (construction is described in Section 5). Time, industry, and firm
fixed e↵ects are included when indicated. Control variables are described in the Appendix. The observations have
annual frequency. Errors are clustered both at the firm and the time level (two-dimensional clustering). The data
sample goes from 1990 to 2010.
Dep.Variable:
Annual R&D Spending
over Book Assets (1) (2) (3) (4)
E[FTPD] -0.0057*** -0.0031** -0.0040** -0.0025*
(-4.22) (-2.33) (-2.39) (-1.90)
Size -0.0195*** -0.0063*** -0.0187***
(-19.23) (-18.60) (-18.57)
ROA -0.0083*** -0.0332*** -0.0088***
(-4.74) (-12.99) (-4.80)
Cash 0.0154*** 0.1239*** 0.0140***
(3.17) (26.17) (2.81)
TQ 0.0062*** 0.0076*** 0.0060***
(14.31) (13.21) (12.11)
Past Stock Returns -0.0026*** 0.0016**
(-2.78) (2.27)
Past Stock Volatility 0.0452*** -0.0072
(6.36) (-1.32)
Constant 0.0867*** 0.1834*** 0.0793*** 0.1787***
(46.70) (30.31) (20.71) (28.53)
Time Fixed E↵ects Y Y Y Y
Industry Fixed E↵ects N N Y N
Firm Fixed E↵ects Y Y N Y
Observations 48,800 47,606 46,487 46,487
R-squared 0.773 0.793 0.494 0.797
Robust t-statistics in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 9: Subsamples
This table reports coe cients from a linear regression of R&D spending over book assets at the beginning of the year
on FTPD and controls. FTPD is a dummy variable that takes value one if the price of the stock was subject to FTP for
at least one quarter in year t, and zero otherwise. Time, industry, and firm fixed e↵ects are included when indicated.
Control variables are described in the Appendix. The observations have annual frequency. Errors are clustered both
at the firm and the time level (two-dimensional clustering). The data sample is split in observations from 1990 to 2000
and from 2001 to 2010.
Dep.Variable: 1990-2000 2001-2010
Annual R&D Spending
over Book Assets (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
FTPD -0.0076*** -0.0074*** -0.0066*** -0.0046*** -0.0047*** -0.0045***
(-3.63) (-3.45) (-3.09) (-3.29) (-3.43) (-3.30)
Size -0.0078*** -0.0071*** -0.0252*** -0.0244***
(-4.28) (-3.85) (-12.46) (-12.01)
ROA -0.0074* -0.0072* -0.0047 -0.0061
(-1.94) (-1.94) (-1.08) (-1.19)
Cash 0.0035 0.0035 0.0163** 0.0140*
(0.37) (0.35) (2.15) (1.85)
TQ 0.0056*** 0.0054*** 0.0073*** 0.0076***
(8.05) (6.73) (9.41) (8.09)
Past Stock Returns 0.0001 -0.0001
(0.05) (-0.17)
Past Stock Volatility 0.0163 -0.0066
(1.59) (-0.87)
Constant 0.0903*** 0.1156*** 0.1080*** 0.0879*** 0.2181*** 0.2138***
(54.10) (12.12) (10.86) (49.62) (18.12) (17.43)
Time Fixed E↵ects Y Y Y Y Y Y
Firm Fixed E↵ects Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 18,505 17,997 17,700 19,440 18,872 18,466
R-squared 0.805 0.813 0.815 0.804 0.823 0.827
Robust t-statistics in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 10: Propensity Score Matching
This table reports coe cients from a linear regression of R&D spending over book assets at the beginning of the year
on FTPD and controls. FTPD is a dummy variable that takes value one if the price of the stock was subject to FTP for
at least one quarter in year t, and zero otherwise. Time, industry, and firm fixed e↵ects are included when indicated.
The control group keeps only observations that are the most similar to each observation in the treatment group (i.e.,
a logit regression is run on industry dummies, size, past returns, Tobin’s Q, and ROA). The observations have annual
frequency. Errors are clustered both at the firm and the time level (two-dimensional clustering). The data sample
goes from 1990 to 2010.
Dep.Variable:
Annual R&D Spending
over Book Assets (1) (2) (3) (4)
FTPD -0.0085*** -0.0074*** -0.0063** -0.0076***
(-3.20) (-3.03) (-2.46) (-3.11)
Size -0.0176*** -0.0066*** -0.0175***
(-5.01) (-7.05) (-4.93)
ROA -0.0157* -0.0345*** -0.0161*
(-1.76) (-3.05) (-1.78)
Cash 0.0047 0.0804*** 0.0035
(0.27) (6.09) (0.21)
TQ 0.0073*** 0.0082*** 0.0069***
(7.35) (6.10) (6.72)
Past Stock Returns -0.0022 0.0021
(-1.15) (1.31)
Past Stock Volatility 0.0800*** 0.0003
(4.12) (0.02)
Constant 0.0677*** 0.1708*** 0.0724*** 0.1700***
(18.27) (7.23) (7.49) (6.83)
Time Fixed E↵ects Y Y Y Y
Industry Fixed E↵ects N N Y N
Firm Fixed E↵ects Y Y N Y
Observations 6,375 6,355 6,355 6,355
R-squared 0.826 0.841 0.514 0.841
Robust t-statistics in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 11: R&D scaled on market value
This table reports coe cients from a linear regression of R&D spending over market value at the beginning of the year
on FTPD and controls. FTPD is a dummy variable that takes value one if the price of the stock was subject to FTP for
at least one quarter in year t, and zero otherwise. Time, industry, and firm fixed e↵ects are included when indicated.
Control variables are described in the Appendix. The observations have annual frequency. Errors are clustered both
at the firm and the time level (two-dimensional clustering). The data sample goes from 1990 to 2010.
Dep.Variable:
Annual R&D Spending
over Market Value (1) (2) (3) (4)
FTPD -0.0088*** -0.0055*** -0.0058*** -0.0051***
(-9.36) (-6.05) (-5.21) (-5.68)
Size -0.0219*** -0.0059*** -0.0206***
(-23.13) (-19.88) (-21.45)
ROA -0.0058*** -0.0188*** -0.0044***
(-3.97) (-7.60) (-2.85)
Cash -0.0297*** 0.0223*** -0.0240***
(-7.71) (5.85) (-6.20)
TQ -0.0039*** -0.0051*** -0.0035***
(-9.91) (-10.98) (-8.07)
Past Stock Returns -0.0068*** -0.0059***
(-7.30) (-7.62)
Past Stock Volatility 0.0692*** 0.0122**
(10.82) (2.29)
Constant 0.0694*** 0.2087*** 0.0963*** 0.2018***
(49.24) (35.44) (30.44) (32.78)
Time Fixed E↵ects Y Y Y Y
Industry Fixed E↵ects N N Y N
Firm Fixed E↵ects Y Y N Y
Observations 26,141 25,340 24,828 24,828
R-squared 0.658 0.693 0.354 0.703
Robust t-statistics in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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